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Introduction
When can dispute resolution decrease the level of obligation in an inter-
national agreement? The general assumption in international relations and
international law is that dispute resolution is a commitment mechanism.
Theoretical accounts maintain that dispute resolution provisions raise the
reputational costs of breaching treaty rules. In empirical studies, dispute
resolution provisions are treated as an indicator of greater obligation. This
Article argues that dispute resolution provisions can sometimes make inter-
national legal obligation easier to breach, and that governments may design
dispute resolution systems to facilitate breach, rather than deter it. Where
dispute resolution systems include specific remedy provisions, the system
may price breach, permitting states to deviate from the agreement so long as
the remedy is paid. By selling an alternative to compliance, dispute resolu-
tion systems can decrease the reputational costs of breach and provide gov-
ernments with great flexibility in meeting their international obligations.
Within the international law and international relations fields, reputation
is considered one of the primary means to promote state compliance with
international rules and dispute resolution decisions.1 Despite disciplinary
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1. See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); Jack Goldsmith &
Eric Posner, The Limits of International Law (2005); Andrew Guzman, How International
Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (2008) [hereinafter How International Law Works];
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy 105–08 (1984); Robert Scott & Paul Stephan, The Limits of the Leviathan: Con-
tract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law (2006) [hereinafter Scott & Ste-
phan, The Limits of the Leviathan]; Michael Tomz, Reputation and International
Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries (2007). See generally Oona Hathaway, Be-
tween Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 469 (2005);
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differences, both fields have independently emphasized the positive role of
reputation in sustaining international cooperation without a centralized en-
forcement system. In addition, the conventional wisdom holds that formal
dispute resolution heightens the reputational costs of noncompliance to gov-
ernments. The logic is that states face greater reputational losses from non-
compliance because a dispute resolution body authoritatively adjudicates
whether a government has breached an agreement and then widely broad-
casts the state’s breach to the international audience.2 This is damaging to
the state because it publicizes the state’s noncompliance and thus reduces its
future opportunities to form treaties.3 Drawing on this logic, some interna-
tional law scholars argue that the potential reputational costs of having a
dispute resolution institution are so significant that states are reluctant to
establish international courts even if there would be some functional gains
from having such a system.4
Laurence R. Helfer, Response, Not Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design, 31 Yale J. Int’l
L. 367, 369 (2006) [hereinafter Helfer, Reservations]; Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R.
Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and
Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ. & Pol. 1 (1990); George Norman & Joel Trachtman, The Customary Interna-
tional Law Game, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 541, 567 (2005); Joost Pauwelyn, The Calculation and Design of Trade
Retaliation in Context: What is the Goal of Suspending WTO Obligations?, in The Law, Economics, and
Politics of Retaliation in WTO Dispute Resolution 34 (Chad P. Bown & Joost Pauwelyn eds.,
2010); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1,
17–18 (2005); Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Reply to Helfer and Slaughter, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 957, 959–60
(2005) [hereinafter Judicial Independence]; Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99
Am. J. Int’l L. 581 (2005); Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation
and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J. Legal Stud. S179 (2002); Robert E. Scott &
Paul B. Stephan, Self-Enforcing International Agreements and the Limits of Coercion, 2004 Wis. L. Rev. 551
(2004) [hereinafter Scott & Stephan, Self-Enforcing Agreements]; Beth A. Simmons, International Law and
State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 819
(2000).
2. Kenneth Abbott & Duncal Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 Int’l Org.
421, 427–30 (2000) (“Because legal review allows allegations and defenses to be tested under accepted
standards and procedures, it increases reputational costs if a violation is found.”); Laurence Helfer & Ann-
Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Posner & Yoo, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 899,
934–35 (2005) [hereinafter Helfer & Slaughter, International Tribunals] (noting that dispute resolution
institutions brand violators and lead to reputational losses for the state that will, in turn, make it more
difficult for the state to join future agreements); Raustiala, supra note 1, at 606–13 (2005) (noting that R
international courts improve compliance with international law by raising the reputational costs to states
of breach); Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S197 (2002) (noting that “the value of a central dispute R
resolution authority [is] to hear the merits of complaints, even if that authority has no power to authorize
sanctions. By serving as a vehicle for transmitting information about violations throughout the trading
system, central dispute resolution enhances the reputational costs of cheating”).
3. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2, at 427; Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 17–18; R
Raustiala, supra note 1, at 606; Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S196–97 (noting that nations that R
renege on promises will have less favorable future dealings not only with the injured nation but with all
nations that observe the breach).
4. See generally Andrew Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to International Dispute
Resolution, 31 J. Legal Stud. 303 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, The Cost of Credibility] (arguing that
states will often refuse to create third-party dispute settlement mechanisms because these mechanisms
impose reputational costs on the losing state without creating significant benefits for the successful
state).
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The conventional wisdom further maintains that the dispute resolution
system that includes formal remedies and reputational costs are additive.
Formal remedies, such as restrictive access to foreign markets or monetary
losses, build onto the pre-existing reputational costs that a state suffers. For-
mal remedies thus uniformly raise the costs of deviating from international
law. As such, international law scholars argue, reputational concerns and
formal remedies will act in combination as a stronger deterrent to states,
leading to greater compliance with international law. If states deviate from
international law when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs,5 and if
dispute resolution institutions raise the costs of noncompliance, then the
hardening of international law, by establishing formal adjudication or ex-
plicit remedies, will lead to better enforcement of international rules, as
compared to a system without dispute resolution.
This widely-accepted view that dispute resolution consistently raises the
reputational costs of noncompliance to states is exaggerated and (in some
instances) mistaken. This Article argues that dispute resolution institutions
can (but will not always) lower the reputational losses associated with breach.
The essential contention of this Article is that international dispute resolu-
tion institutions can lead the audience to lower its perception of the impor-
tance of compliance and view the breaching state as cooperative if it abides
by the remedy regime. Formal remedies can serve as a fine rather than a
sanction. As framed by Robert Cooter, fines “price” breach. If paid, the fine
eliminates, or at least decreases, the reputational costs of the deviation, be-
cause the appropriate remedy has been offered. In contrast, sanctions punish
breach but do not excuse it. This Article articulates how the process of in-
corporating a dispute resolution system with formal remedies into a treaty
regime can price breach by changing the audience’s perception of the
mandatory nature of a treaty’s substantive provisions.
This insight highlights an important institutional design element that
has been overlooked by international relations scholars: states may create
dispute resolution systems to facilitate breach, rather than to deter it. Dis-
pute resolution systems can serve as a pricing mechanism, designed by nego-
tiators to allow states to make use of the remedy regime as an alternative to
performance. The addition of a remedy regime may lead the audience to
view the “cooperative equilibrium” that the treaty represents as not de-
manding compliance, but selling an option to breach at a price. Accord-
ingly, the audience may view the treaty as accepting breach if the remedies
are met, particularly when the treaty regime provides for remedies that are
less than what is necessary to deter breach. As such, a state that deviates
from the treaty’s substantive provisions, but continues to abide by the
treaty’s second-order rules (that is, the dispute resolution procedures and the
remedy regime) can be viewed as cooperative. While the breaching state
5. See generally Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 1; Guzman, How International Law Works, R
supra note 1; Simmons, supra note 1. R
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may suffer some reputational loss—as compliance with the treaty’s substan-
tive rules may be preferred to compliance with the treaty’s dispute resolu-
tion rules—this reputational loss will be less than the loss that the state
would have suffered if the treaty did not have a dispute resolution system.6
Dispute resolution systems can decrease the reputational costs of devia-
tions from a treaty regime in two ways: (1) by establishing beliefs in the
relevant audience that breach of a treaty’s substantive terms is acceptable if
the remedies are met; and (2) by permitting states to demonstrate their
cooperativeness by abiding by the treaty’s remedy regime.
First, the dispute resolution system can shape the audience’s beliefs re-
garding the nature of treaty obligations, especially with regard to whether
and under which circumstances breach is acceptable. This Article argues
that a treaty’s substantive obligations and its dispute resolution system are
not analytically independent. Treaty obligations have a clear and uncon-
troversial relationship to the dispute resolution system; substantive treaty
provisions supply the inputs for dispute resolution. Without treaty obliga-
tions, there can be no substantive law for a third party to adjudicate. With-
out breach, there is no need to discuss remedies. Less obvious is the other
part of this relationship: the feedback effect between the dispute resolution
system and treaty obligations. The treaty’s remedies have an influence on the
audience’s perception of the nature of the treaty’s obligations and thereby
influence the reputational effects of breaching the treaty’s substantive
provisions.
This influence can work in either a positive or a negative direction. If the
treaty imposes remedies that eliminate the gains from breach or require ad-
ditional punitive damages, this remedy can act as a sanction and revise up-
ward the audience’s beliefs about the mandatory nature of the treaty
obligation. In such a situation, dispute resolution would work much as the
conventional wisdom predicts. The breaching party may suffer a reputa-
tional loss as a result of breach in addition to the treaty’s formal sanctions.7
In contrast, if the treaty imposes less than deterrence-level damages, such as
compensatory damages or exclusively prospective damages, this remedy can
act as a price for the breach and revise downward the audience’s beliefs about
the importance of compliance. In such a situation, the remedy regime may
serve to price breach rather than eliminate it or even stigmatize it. Remedies
thus have the potential to redefine noncompliance as a violation of the
6. My claim is a relative one: dispute resolution institutions can reduce a government’s reputational
sanctions from breach relative to a state of the world without such institutions. The argument is not that
dispute resolution systems will eliminate or substantially lower reputational sanctions in all circum-
stances. Instead, I examine whether dispute resolution systems can decrease such sanctions as compared to
a world without dispute resolution regimes.
7. The relationship may not work in this direction if formal sanctions “crowd out” informal sanctions.
See Scott & Stephan, Limits of the Leviathan, supra note 1, at 23 (arguing that formal institutions R
can crowd out reciprocity and reputational effects). I discuss the possibility of both upward revision and
crowding out infra.
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treaty’s remedy rules or as the failure to pay remedies when ordered, rather
than as a breach of the substantive rules of the regime. In short, an alterna-
tive to compliance can be sold.
Second, dispute resolution institutions permit the breaching state to
demonstrate its cooperativeness by accepting the authority of the dispute
settlement institution. In this sense, much of the reputational effect of dis-
pute resolution may come not from the finding or publicity of breach, but
instead from the state’s response to that finding. In the international system,
compliance with remedy regimes, like compliance with substantive rules, is
essentially voluntary. Thus, a government’s compliance with the treaty’s dis-
pute resolution system, including the alteration of its policy after a case is
adjudicated or its acceptance of the regime’s remedies for breach, can signal
to the audience the government’s commitment to the treaty’s goals and will-
ingness to comply with the broader treaty regime (the treaty’s second-order
rules). This is different from the domestic law realm, in which complaining
parties use the coercive power of the state to enforce the remedy orders of
judges or arbitrators. In the domestic context, the payment of a remedy
award says little about the cooperativeness of a contract partner. In contrast,
a state’s voluntary assent to a tribunal-ordered remedy demonstrates cooper-
ation. Compliance with second-order rules can even become the operative
metric for the audience’s reputational analysis.
Understanding the relationship between dispute resolution institutions
and reputational costs is essential to an evaluation of several key institu-
tional design issues. The design of optimal remedy regimes requires a theory
of how reputational concerns will interact with formal remedies, including
monetary damages, other forms of compensation, and authorizations to re-
sort to self-help. This includes an awareness of how the remedies will shape
the audience’s perception of the treaty obligations, as well as the possibility
that formal sanctions may not be additive to informal sanctions. Otherwise,
dispute resolution systems may result in higher or lower sanctions than the
treaty designers intended.
An important implication of the optimal remedy approach, which this
Article explores, is the idea that governments may create formal dispute
resolution systems to lower the costs of deviation rather than to raise them.
Remedy regimes can lower the reputational costs of breach and permit gov-
ernments to treat remedies as an alternative to compliance at a set price.
This is contrary to the prevailing view among international law scholars that
formal dispute resolution systems will always increase the level of compli-
ance with international rules. These scholars argue that a system of indepen-
dent international tribunals can increase states’ compliance with
international law, relying in part on governments’ concerns about their rep-
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utations to support their argument.8 This claim is not necessarily mistaken,
but, in some cases, a different causal relationship may exist. I demonstrate
that, by embedding dispute resolution within a broader cooperative arrange-
ment, formal dispute resolution institutions may alter the audience’s under-
standing of what the treaty’s cooperative equilibrium entails and, for some
treaties, lower the reputational costs of deviations from substantive rules.
Therefore, negotiators may create a system of third-party adjudication and
remedies specifically as a means of facilitating breach.
As used in this Article, the terms breach and violation have different and
specific meanings. Breach refers to a deviation from the substantive terms of
a treaty; any state action that is contrary to the first-order rules of an agree-
ment is a breach. Breaches can be resolved within the treaty’s framework
through dispute resolution and remedies. In contrast, a violation of a treaty
signifies a deviation from the dispute resolution rules; any state action that
is contrary to the second-order rules of the agreement, such as refusing to
pay any remedial damages, is a violation. Using these definitions, a state can
breach a treaty (deviating from its substantive rules) without violating the
treaty (deviating from its second-order rules). Any time a state breaches a
treaty’s substantive terms, it can stay within the treaty’s framework (not
violating the treaty) by accepting the jurisdiction of the dispute resolution
system and complying with the remedy. In my analysis, a state both
breaches and violates the treaty when it deviates from the substantive rules
of the regime and refuses to comply with the dispute settlement system.9
Part I begins by establishing the prevailing view of the state’s “reputation
for cooperativeness” in the international law and international relations
literature. This section demonstrates that the prevailing view generally
holds that states develop good reputations in order to have future opportuni-
ties to join treaty regimes, and that dispute resolution institutions consist-
ently raise the reputational costs of deviating from treaty obligations. Part II
challenges this prevailing view by articulating how dispute resolution insti-
tutions can influence the audience’s understanding of a deviation from a
treaty regime, thereby altering the reputational importance of a state’s
breach. This section builds on Robert Scott and Paul Stephan’s important
discussion of how formal courts can crowd out informal remedies in interna-
8. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2, at 427; Hathaway, supra note 1, at 494; Laurence R. Helfer & R
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273, 276
(1997) [hereinafter Helfer & Slaughter, Supranational Adjudication]; Helfer & Slaughter, International
Tribunals, supra note 2, at 904. R
9. It is theoretically possible for a state to violate a treaty but not breach it under these definitions.
For instance, if a state were wrongly accused of violating a treaty’s substantive terms, then refused to
comply with the dispute resolution system, this would be a violation without being a breach. The state
would have complied with all of the substantive provisions of the treaty, thus not breaching it, but
would have deviated from the second-order rules of the agreement, thereby violating the treaty. While
this situation is theoretically possible, it is unlikely to occur in practice because states that have not
deviated from any substantive rules are unlikely to resist the jurisdiction of the dispute resolution system.
States may undertake such actions in exceptional cases but are unlikely to do so as a common practice.
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tional law10 by explaining how the crowding-out effect is much broader than
these authors suggest, affecting a host of international institutions, and not
just highly developed courts. Part III provides examples from the World
Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) treaty regime, bilateral investment treaties,
and the public responses to states’ deviations from these international eco-
nomic agreements to illustrate how dispute resolution institutions may de-
crease the reputational costs of breach.
Part IV argues that this choice of a dispute resolution system is often a
purposeful effort to limit remedies to the harm caused, and thus to price
noncompliance rather than to sanction it. In addition, this Part incorporates
discussions of institutional “flexibility” from political science, which high-
lights how cooperation may become more robust as a self-enforcing equilib-
rium if it permits more defections.11 From this view, institutional design
features that facilitate treaty breach can enable greater cooperation by per-
mitting more flexible provisions in the negotiation stage and more escape
options in the implementation phase.12 The political science literature has
thus far not focused on how these flexibility mechanisms interact with infor-
mal sanctions, such as reputation and reciprocity, which is surprising given
the heavy emphasis in international relations scholarship on reputation as an
enforcement device. This Article attempts to integrate political science liter-
ature’s focus on flexibility with scholarly work in international law.
Part V concludes by discussing how negotiators may accidently lower the
reputational costs of breach by establishing a formal remedy regime. Such a
remedy mismatch has significant implications for international law theories
of institutional design and optimal remedies. While this Article focuses on
international economic agreements, the relationship between remedies and
the audience’s beliefs about the mandatory nature of substantive treaty rules
is an issue for other types of treaties as well. This section discusses the possi-
ble implications for human rights treaties and environmental agreements,
namely how attempts to “harden” international rules by adding formal rem-
edies may be self-defeating because remedies may lower the reputational
costs of breach and, in some cases, may also lower the overall level of
enforcement.
10. See generally Scott & Stephan, Limits of the Leviathan, supra note 1 (arguing that formal R
institutions can crowd out reciprocity and reputational effects).
11. The approach of this Article is a positive theoretical approach, not a normative approach. This
Article claims that dispute resolution institutions can, and sometimes do, decrease reputational costs to
states. The claim is not that lowering reputational costs of defections is beneficial for the international
legal system or would improve global welfare. Understanding how reputational mechanisms are likely to
work, however, is important for scholars who more directly engage in normative analyses.
12. See generally Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT “Escape
Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1991) [hereinafter Sykes, Protectionism as a
“Safeguard”]; B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions:
Uncertainty and Escape, 55 Int’l Org. 829 (2001); Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Enforcement,
Private Political Pressure, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Escape
Clause, 34 J. Legal Stud. 471 (2005); George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfec-
tion? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations 76–104 (1995).
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I. The Conventional Account
The relevant reputation generally discussed in international relations and
international law scholarship is a “reputation for cooperativeness,” because
it is this reputation that treaty partners are interested in when entering into
negotiations. As I show below, this literature generally holds the view that
compliance with international agreements is the basis for the state’s reputa-
tion for cooperativeness. It also embraces the conventional wisdom that dis-
pute resolution institutions will raise the reputational costs to states that
breach international law.
The standard model of reputation in international law focuses on the
“state’s reputation” and assumes that the state has a single reputation for
cooperativeness that encompasses all issue areas.13 These assumptions (the
“unitary state” view and the “unitary reputation” view) concern how the
audience perceives the state and how the audience assesses information about
the state’s reputation.14 Scholars who use these assumptions do not necessa-
rily believe that they are true, but argue that these are simplifying assump-
tions that are appropriate for models of reputational effects.15
13. See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2; Guzman, How International Law Works, supra R
note 1; Hathaway, supra note 1; Raustiala, supra note 1; Simmons, supra note 1. R
14. This Article emphasizes reputation as a perception belonging to the members of the audience,
rather than an asset that the state can directly control. The audience can be any observer of the state’s
actions. Observers include public actors (such as other governments; political parties, even when not in
power; diplomats; members of international organizations; regulators; and judges), as well as private
actors (such as corporations, private investors, policy-oriented non-governmental organizations, and vot-
ers). Moreover, these audience perceptions can change according to forces beyond the state’s reach. Most
international law and international relations scholars acknowledge this collective possession of reputation
by the audience, but for ease of exposition, they model reputation as belonging to the state. This Article
tries to depart from that simplifying assumption and argues that it is probably most useful to consider
the audience as having a range of views, with different agreements having different means and distribu-
tions. The view of reputation as belonging to the audience also highlights the psychological aspects of
reputation, thus emphasizing the role of perception, beliefs, and cognitive biases in the formation of
audience members’ views of a state’s reputation. This approach can further provide hypotheses as to how
reputation and dispute resolution institutions will interact in bilateral, multilateral, and public-private
relationships.
15. See, e.g., Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1, at 17–19 (articulating and R
justifying “standard rational choice assumptions”). See generally Timothy J. McKeown, The Limitations of
“Structural” Theories of Commercial Policy, 40 Int’l Org., 43–52 (1986) (discussing the broader justifica-
tions (and limits) to simplifying assumption in international relations theory). As commentators have
argued elsewhere, these assumptions are problematic because they can systematically bias our under-
standing of how reputation works and dramatically inflate the potential effects of reputation in promot-
ing compliance with international law in a wide range of areas. See generally George Downs & Michael
Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. S95 (2002); Rachel Brewster,
Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 Harv. Int’l L.J. 231 (2009). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this
Article, I accept and use these assumptions. I do so because they represent the strongest possible assump-
tions for the proposition that dispute resolution systems increase the reputational costs to the state for
noncompliance with international rules. I do not mean to suggest that these assumptions are the correct
level for modeling reputation. Rather, I am attempting to create the best possible conditions for the
prevailing account’s argument and the highest bar for demonstrating that dispute resolution institutions
do not always increase the reputational costs to governments/states. If the conventional wisdom that
dispute resolution adds to the state’s reputational losses does not hold even with these assumptions
incorporated, then they are even less likely to hold with different assumptions, such as attaching the
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A. A Reputation for Cooperativeness
States are interested in forming international agreements that offer bene-
fits to the state and look for treaty partners that could also benefit from
cooperation.16 The fact that a treaty is in both states’ mutual interest does
not assure compliance with the agreement’s rules. A party to the treaty may
have an interest in choosing cooperation over the status quo because the
gains to the party are greater than in a world without the international
agreement, but may nonetheless have an incentive to cheat because it will
gain more if it defects while other states comply.17 All parties understand
the underlying strategic situation and its implication that cooperation is
beneficial, but that obstacles to cooperation may persist. As a result, states
are careful in selecting treaty partners. A state may announce that it plans to
abide by a treaty’s terms, but potential partners cannot be certain that the
state will resist the temptation to cheat on the agreement at a later date.
The state’s reputation—the audience’s knowledge of its past behavior—
provides potential treaty partners with information on the state’s future co-
operativeness.18 If the state has cheated on treaties in the past, then other
states may assume that the state may be likely to do so again in the future.19
The audience does not need to understand the domestic reason for the cheat-
ing to form an opinion, although such information may be useful.20 The
cause can vary from a scofflaw dictatorial ruler to a gridlocked separation-of-
powers system that makes passing the necessary implementing legislation
difficult. The audience can apply its knowledge of the government’s reputa-
tion when deciding whether to include the government in a particular treaty
agreement.21 A government with a poor reputation may be completely ex-
relevant reputation to particular governmental regimes or officials or limiting the scope of reputation to
specific issue areas.
16. See generally Keohane, supra note 1. R
17. See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2; Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 1. R
18. See generally sources cited supra note 1; Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2, at 427 (noting that the costs R
of violating a hard law commitment are particularly high because “the reputational effects of a violation
can be generalized to all agreements subject to international law”).
19. Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1, at 35–36. R
20. How much information a prospective partner will gather on the government depends on a num-
ber of factors, including the extent of the cooperation and the search costs of obtaining additional
information.
21. If a member of the audience has complete information regarding the state’s course of action or
probability of taking various policy actions, then reputation becomes irrelevant. In such a case, the
audience member does not need the additional information that reputation provides and will rationally
ignore it. In international relations, audience members rarely, if ever, have complete information on a
state’s future actions. Thus, reputation is widely believed to be relevant in a broad variety of settings. The
informational point, however, remains important. First, to the extent that the state’s past actions cease to
be predictive of its future actions—for example, because of a change in leadership or in the form of
government—then the state’s reputation is either discounted or ceases to be pertinent. Second, reputa-
tional analysis is not a sanctioning system, and the inclusion of reputation in the audience’s analysis is
not costly (it is in the audience’s interest to incorporate the information that it has about the state to the
point where information-related search costs equal the expected benefits of greater information), while
imposing sanctions often is. See generally Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1. R
Third, the audience is not actively trying to reward or punish the state for its past acts in considering the
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cluded. Alternatively, a government may be included in the treaty, but its
reputation may remain relevant in the treaty negotiations.22 For instance, if
State A abides by its trade concessions ninety percent of the time while State
B does so eighty percent of the time, trade concessions by State A will be
worth more than those by State B, all else being equal. As a result, reputa-
tion is thought to influence state decisionmaking. A state wants to comply
with international law today because doing so will expand the state’s oppor-
tunities to engage in beneficial cooperative activity tomorrow.
It is important to note that a reputation for cooperativeness within the
regimes the state has joined is the operative reputation.23 Complying with
existing treaty obligations can be a very different matter than being per-
ceived as a good global citizen.24 For instance, the refusal to take on legal
obligations might do much more to influence the popular perception of the
state than its breach of legal obligations. The United States’ refusal to join
the International Criminal Court has almost certainly hurt its reputation as
a responsible member of international society. An American government
looking to improve the popular image of the United States abroad might do
better by committing to the Criminal Court, even if compliance is likely to
be less than perfect, than by refusing the legal obligations altogether. Yet,
by refusing to take on legal obligations, the United States is arguably en-
hancing its reputation for compliance within regimes it has joined by de-
clining to sign treaties with which the government does not plan to obey.25
A reputation for cooperativeness is thought to be critical because it is this
reputation that provides information about how a prospective treaty mem-
ber will act as a member of an agreement.26 A state’s actions in issue areas
where it does not have a legal obligation are less informative of the state’s
future behavior as a treaty partner.
B. A Reputation for Cooperativeness and Dispute Resolution Institutions
The conventional account maintains that dispute resolution heightens the
reputational costs to governments of breaching treaty obligations through
two mechanisms: (1) providing an independent and authoritative decision
state’s reputation. Past bad (or good) acts that the audience considers irrelevant towards the state’s future
behavior, whether towards cooperation in general or towards a specific treaty regime, are not incorporated
into reputational analysis.
22. Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 579, 596 (2005)
[hereinafter Guzman, International Agreements] (“When making a promise, a state pledges its reputation
as a form of collateral. A state with a better reputation has more valuable collateral and, therefore, can
extract more in exchange for its own promises.”); Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S196–97 (discussing R
how the future value of trade concessions are diminished by breach).
23. See generally Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1; Brewster, supra note 15. R
24. See Brewster, supra note 15. For instance, the phrase “illegal but legitimate” highlights the gap R
between actions that are widely understood to be good policy and actions that are legally permissible.
25. Edward Swaine, Reserving, 31 Yale J. Int’l L. 307, 340 (2006) (discussing this effect with
reservations).
26. See generally Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1. R
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on whether a breach has occurred; and (2) publicizing the announcement of
a breach to a wide audience.
First, dispute resolution addresses the “auto-interpretation” problem in
international law: without a dispute settlement institution, either ad hoc or
permanent, governments are left to make their own decision regarding
whether or not a breach of international law has occurred.27 This involves
both an assessment of what event actually occurred and whether that event
was in breach of some international obligation.28 The international system is
a noisy informational environment, and various governments may reach dif-
ferent decisions and may have low levels of confidence in their decisions.
Formal dispute resolution can provide clearer information to the interna-
tional audience.29 Adjudicative bodies can declare their findings of fact as
well as their legal analysis of whether a breach of international law has oc-
curred. While the international audience may not strictly believe that the
dispute resolution system is always correct in its assessments, a dispute reso-
lution system can at least provide a credible narrative around which the
international audience can coalesce.30 Having a dispute resolution system
heightens the reputational costs of cheating to the state because the state
cannot credibly maintain that it is not in breach of the treaty and thus
cannot rely on the noisiness of the international system to mask its actions.31
Second, the decision of the international dispute resolution body is widely
and cheaply available to all members of the audience, including non-state
actors.32 The dispute resolution system effectively brands the state as being
in breach of international law and broadly advertises this defection.33 This
results in higher reputational losses because more members of the audience
are likely to learn about the breach and because the signal from the dispute
27. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2, at 427 (discussing how delegating interpretation of international R
law rules to a court constraints self-serving interpretations by the respondent state).
28. Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence, supra note 1, at 14–22 (discussing how international tribunals R
can resolve the meaning of the treaty where the parties disagree on the facts or the application of the
treaty rules).
29. See Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 Duke L.J. 775, 782–91 (2012)
(summarizing legal scholarship on international adjudication and concluding that advocates and skeptics
of international adjudication agree that these institutions provide information to the audience).
30. Id.
31. Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at 196–98; Bernhard Zangle, Judicialization Matters! A Comparison R
of Dispute Settlement Under GATT and the WTO, 52 Int’l Stud. Q. 825, 827–30 (2008).
32. Milgrom, North & Weingast, supra note 1 (discussing how the law merchant institution made R
information available to trading parties at a reasonable price); Raustiala, supra note 1, at 606–13 (discuss- R
ing how strong review mechanisms disperse information and thereby influence the state’s reputation).
The signal from the dispute resolution body can be complex if the reader wishes to understand what the
legal reasoning was and what parts of the respondent government’s measure were judged to be legal.
33. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2; Helfer & Slaughter, International Tribunals, supra note 2. The R
publicity aspect can be avoided through institutional design: some dispute resolution systems may be
confidential to the parties and thus decrease this function. To the extent that the dispute resolution
system is not public, its deterrence function declines. Most discussions of dispute resolution in interna-
tional law assume that the resolution process is public. This Article accepts this assumption that dispute
resolution will be public and argues that, even in that case, dispute resolution systems do not necessarily
raise the reputational costs of breach to states.
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settlement body is clear.34 The cheaper and better the information, the more
likely the audience will incorporate this information into its reputational
assessment of the state.35
As a consequence, dispute resolution systems are believed to improve
compliance with international law.36 Because reputation is thought to be
relevant to a state’s future set of potential cooperative ventures, the loss of
reputation can deter states from breaching international agreements. A dis-
pute resolution system can intensify these costs and thereby amplify the
deterrent effect.37
Dispute resolution may also increase other states’ recourse to self-help
measures, such as economic sanctions, by reducing the risk of a reputational
loss for the sanctioning state.38 Thompson describes this as the sanctioner’s
dilemma: a state considering self-help measures may be concerned that its
own actions will be considered breaches of international law and that it will
face reputational damage.39 For instance, a state that suspends its adherence
to a treaty’s obligations in response to what it believes to be another state’s
breach of that treaty is vulnerable to claims that it is itself breaching inter-
national law, if the international audience does not agree that the predicate
action was a breach of international law or that the breaching government’s
action was serious enough to warrant the sanctioning state’s reprisal.40 Dis-
pute settlement institutions are able to clarify when retaliation is warranted.
These institutions can clarify whether a breach occurred and, if given the
jurisdiction to do so, can authorize a specific level of counter-action by the
injured government.41 So long as the retaliating state stays within the limits
set out by the dispute resolution system, the state is unlikely to face reputa-
tional harm.42 This raises the expected costs of deviations of international
rules. Because the dispute resolution system protects the sanctioner’s reputa-
34. Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at 196–98; Helfer & Slaughter, International Tribunals, supra note R
2. R
35. Milgrom, North & Weingast, supra note 1. R
36. See sources cited supra note 1. R
37. See Guzman, International Agreements, supra note 22, at 598; Raustiala, supra note 1, at 606. See R
generally Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1. R
38. Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal Institutions, 42 J. Conflict
Resol. 3, 27 (1998). See generally Daniel Kono, Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and
Trade Cooperation, 69 J. Pol. 746 (2006); Alexander Thompson, The Rational Enforcement of International
Law: Solving the Sanctioners’ Dilemma, 1 Int’l Theory 307 (2009).
39. See Thompson, supra note 38. R
40. The United States has frequently been accused of acting illegally in its response to other states’
alleged breaches of international trade law. See generally Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in
International Commercial Relations: The Limited Case for Section 301, 23 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 263 (1992)
(discussing and arguing against the claim that the United States was overly aggressive in its retaliation);
Alan O. Sykes, “Mandatory” Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements: Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design
of Section 301, 8 B.U. Int’l L.J. 301, 311 (1990) (same).
41. See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at 183–88 (arguing that limiting retaliation is the primary R
rationale for the WTO dispute settlement system). See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 27. R
42. Thompson, supra note 38, at 317–18. R
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tion, the sanctioning state is more likely to punish breaches of international
law.
II. Role of Dispute Resolution Institutions in
Establishing Beliefs
Against the conventional model outlined in the previous section, this Ar-
ticle argues that breaches of a treaty obligation do not necessarily lead to
greater reputational losses for the breaching party relative to a system with-
out dispute resolution. Reputational analysis is a highly contextual decision
process and institutions are an important part of this context. Institutions
are not only sets of rules, but also sets of beliefs between parties about what
constitutes cooperative behavior.43 Without institutions, either formal or in-
formal, actions cannot inherently be viewed as cooperative or non-
cooperative. Even apparent acts of kindness, such as offering foreign aid, can
be interpreted positively (as generosity) or negatively (as establishing a de-
pendency relationship).44 Institutions develop expectations among members
concerning future behavior by creating understandings of which future ac-
tions will be considered cooperative.45 In doing so, institutions influence the
audience’s view of whether existing laws or norms were contravened and
what the action implies about the party’s future behavior.
This section examines the role of dispute resolution and remedy regimes
in clarifying the nature of a treaty obligation. Remedies have important
framing effects. Conceived of as a sanction, remedies connote punishment
and community disapproval of certain behaviors. Yet remedies that are
framed as prices connote permission, even an entitlement, to undertake cer-
tain actions. When treaties establish remedy regimes, the treaty designers
necessarily engage this framing issue. Similar discussions on the role of rem-
edy regimes exist in debates in American contract law concerning the nature
of contractual obligations. Much of that debate divides along disagreements
concerning whether contract terms are promises backed by a moral obliga-
tion, economic relationships designed to promote the efficient allocation of
resources, or something else. As this debate highlights, different framings of
the nature of contract obligations result in different views concerning
whether breach should be discouraged, tolerated, or facilitated. These differ-
ent views influence the audience’s perceptions about whether breach should
have an effect on the deviating party’s reputation.
43. See generally Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict: Political Economy of Insti-
tutions and Decisions (1992); Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Ec-
onomic Performance (1990).
44. For a discussion of how generous trade terms can establish a dependence relationship, see Albert
O. Hirschman, National power and the structure of foreign trade (1980).
45. See generally Axelrod, supra note 1; Keohane, supra note 1. R
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Part IV argues that dispute resolution institutions give the breaching
party an opportunity to demonstrate (or not) its compliance with the
broader treaty regimes. Unlike domestic law, in which remedies can be en-
forced by a state with overwhelming coercive force, compliance with remedy
rules in the international system is essentially voluntary. The willingness of
the state to comply with these rules can establish, at least in part, the state’s
continued cooperativeness. Where dispute resolution institutions exist, the
state’s response to the dispute resolution institution’s judgment may be
more determinative of the reputational effects of the breach than is the judg-
ment itself.
A. Prices Versus Sanctions
There is a relationship between the nature of a treaty obligation and the
remedies the treaty offers in case of breach. Even if the drafters of a treaty do
not intend it, the remedies for breach are a statement about the importance
of the rule and the notions about the appropriate remedies if the rule is
breached. In short, remedies have social meanings.46 As the legal literature
has already recognized, remedies can be conceived of as a sanction—a pun-
ishment for undesirable behavior, or a price—a license to engage in behavior
at a certain cost.47 These two functions have very different effects on how the
community perceives the action.48 A sanction is a stigma and re-enforces the
informal remedies that the community may employ, such as social or eco-
nomic isolation, or a loss of reputation.49 A price is the purchase of permis-
sion to engage in a specific action and excludes (or lessens) informal
sanctions because prices imply that the actor is entitled to the behavior: she
has bought the “right” to act in the socially undesirable way.50 So long as
the price is paid, the formal remedies are exclusive of informal remedies;
there are few social implications, and the purchaser does not suffer a reputa-
tional loss.
The key question in this analysis then becomes what makes a remedy a
price and what makes it a sanction. Fundamentally, the difference between
the two is the perception of the audience, but this definition is endogenous
to the effects that we are trying to measure.51 Cooter discusses the difference
between prices and sanctions and distinguishes the two based on a variable
46. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996)
(discussing the differing social meanings of various sanctions); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social
Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 2021 (1996).
47. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 (1998); See generally Rob-
ert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523 (1984).
48. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, supra note 47. R
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2045–46 (“Critics claim that emissions trading has damaging R
effects on social norms by making environmental amenities seem like any other commodity: a good that
has a price, to be set through market mechanisms.”).
51. See Kahan, supra note 46; Sunstein, supra note 46. R
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exogenous to the audience’s perception—the characteristics of the remedy
itself.52 Cooter argues that a charge is a sanction when the remedy is de-
signed to deter the behavior completely, and thus a sanction increases with
the length of the breach and is conditional on the breacher’s state of mind
(whether the breach is intentional).53 The extent of the sanction is not lim-
ited to the damage resulting from the breach but can continue to increase
based on the actions and moral fault of the breacher.54 By contrast, prices are
conditional on the harm the activity causes. The goal of a price is not to
deter persons from engaging in an activity but to permit the activity when
the level of gain is greater than the harm that the activity causes.55 Thus,
whether a remedy is a price is based on the action’s consequences, not the
level necessary to deter the activity.56
Cooter’s framework is not perfect. It has the advantage of defining the
sanctions and price exogenously from community reaction, but it may not
accurately track the social meaning that the audience assigns to the remedy.
For instance, it is possible that a fine set at the level of harm that the activ-
ity causes (defined as a price in Cooter’s framework) will be viewed as a
sanction in the sense that the audience sees the fine as a condemnation of the
person’s actions. For instance, American tort law only permits the recovery
of compensation for harms caused by negligence, but the audience may not
view negligence, even if compensated, as “purchased.” In these cases, infor-
mal community sanctions such as shaming, social exclusion, or loss of repu-
tation may apply to the activity.57 Nonetheless, Cooter’s framework seems to
be a decent rough guide to prices and sanctions in the sense that the com-
munity defines the remedy with social goals in mind. Remedies should track
community views of forbidden versus permissible activities in broad strokes,
even if the categories are not always perfect. Thus, Cooter’s framework is a
good starting point for the prices and sanctions distinction, but a reference
back to the community reaction, where possible, is important for
confirmation.
The difference in the normative forces between prices and sanctions exists
at both the level of substantive law and law enforcement. As a matter of
substantive regulation, the choice between prices and sanctions is at the
forefront in discussions of environmental policy. While economists high-
light the market efficiency of pricing pollution by creating tradable per-
52. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, supra note 47, at 1537–38. R
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Kahan, supra note 46 (discussing why fines are not shaming and thus an insufficient R
alternative to imprisonment or other shaming punishments).
57. See generally Robert R. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 Va L.
Rev. 1603 (2000) (discussing how the creation of a rule, even without enforcement, can create commu-
nity costs).
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mits,58 environmentalists are concerned about the social meaning of
establishing a price for pollution.59 Michael Sandel reflects the views of per-
mit skeptics, arguing that,
[T]urning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold
removes the moral stigma that is properly associated with it, if a
company or a country is fined for spewing excessive pollutants
into the air, the community conveys its judgment that the pol-
luter has done something wrong. A fee, on the other hand, makes
pollution just another cost of doing business, like wages, benefits
and rent. The distinction between a fine and a fee for despoiling
the environment is not one we should give up too easily.60
The form of regulation itself influences the views of the community with re-
spect to the activity. Pricing the activity can create certain benefits, such as
minimizing the cost of pollution control by allowing the firms capable of
abating pollution at the lowest cost to decrease pollution the most,61 but it
also alters the community’s understanding of the pollution reduction re-
quirement. The requirement to reduce pollution goes from being a shared
community responsibility—in which the failure to participate has social
costs—to a system in which one no longer has an individual responsibility
to reduce pollution, but can simply pay others to do so.62 The obligation is
no longer mandatory, but priced.63
Similar discussions regarding the relationship between substantive con-
tract law and remedy rules exist within American scholarship on law en-
forcement and the obligations imposed by contract. Much of this discussion
can be viewed as a disagreement about what the nature of contract obliga-
tions and remedies are. Some scholars, such as Charles Fried, argue that the
58. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic
Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 171 (1987); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-
and-Trade System To Address Climate Change, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 293 (2008); Jonathan Baert Wie-
ner, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 Yale L.J. 677, 724 (1999).
59. John P. Dwyer, The Use of Market Incentives in Controlling Air Pollution: California’s Marketable
Permits Program, 20 Ecology L.Q. 103, 111 (1993); Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All “Legal
Dollars” Created Equal?, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 223, 234 (2008); Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental
Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 27, 34; Sunstein, supra note 46, at R
2045–46 (“Critics claim that emissions trading has damaging effects on social norms by making environ-
mental amenities seem like any other commodity: a good that has a price, to be set through market
mechanisms.”); Wiener, supra note 58, at 724. But see Lior Jacob Strahleivitz, How Changes in Property R
Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 Ind. L.J. 1231, 1292–93 (2000)
(arguing that commodification can bolster some environmental norms).
60. Michael J. Sandel, It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1997, at A23.
61. Stavins, supra note 58. R
62. Sandel, supra note 60, at A23; Sunstein, supra note 46, at 2045; Rose, supra note 59, at 34. R
63. Robert E. Goodin, Selling Environmental Indulgences, 47 Kyklos 573, 583 (1994) (“A religious
indulgence is granted upon condition of the indulged feeling true contrition for their sins. The environ-
mental indulgence may be granted, by the same token, upon condition of the indulged showing that they
have no other choice and that they have made good-faith (albeit unsucessful) efforts to avoid damage to
the environment. The objection here in view is not conditionality as such, but rather to making the
granting of the indulgence conditional upon payment of hard, cold cash.”).
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parties to a contract have made a mutual promise to fulfill the terms of the
contract and that they have a moral obligation to stand by that promise.64
The remedy regime in American contract law, however, does not impose
penalties for breach that would incentivize compliance appropriate with a
moral obligation to keep a promise.65 Contract law generally only offers par-
ties expectation damages and imposes an obligation on the breached-upon
party to mitigate its damages.66 If contractual agreements are promises that
the parties are morally obligated to fulfill (and the goal of remedies is to
incentivize actions consistent with the goals of contract law), then more
appropriate remedies would include punitive damages for breach of contract
or specific performance, even if we expect parties to bargain for a monetary
settlement.67 Fried acknowledges that the available remedies may not be
strong enough to encourage the appropriate level of contract compliance but
maintains that the lack of remedies should not undercut the sense of moral
obligation in keeping the substantive promise.68 He argues for the reform of
contract rules in some areas, such as the assignment of attorney’s fees, but
generally supports the current set of contract remedies, including expecta-
tion damages and the obligation to mitigate damages, based in part on the
moral obligations of the breached-upon party to minimize unnecessary
loss.69
Other scholars who embrace a moral-agent perspective (if not a contract-
as-moral-promise view) are more disturbed by the lack of adequate remedies.
Seana Shiffrin argues that the lack of appropriate remedies denigrates
promises, fails to provide a legal structure that a morally decent person
could accept, and potentially undermines the legal and social culture neces-
sary for democracy.70 She maintains that the contract law requirement that
the breached-upon party mitigate its losses and prohibitions on punitive
damages creates conditions that make it impossible for moral agency to
flourish, promoting a societal view that gives the benefits of breach to the
party in the moral wrong.71 Thus, for Shiffrin, the nature of the legal obliga-
tion and remedies have a tight relationship: the failure of the regime to
provide for adequate remedies undermines the nature of the obligation and
provides belief among the audience that breach is acceptable.
64. See generally Charles Fried, Contract as Promise (2007).
65. See generally Charles Fried, Contract as Promise: 30 Years Later, 44 Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcom-
ing 2012) [hereinafter Fried, Promise 30 Years Later].
66. Id. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev.
708 (2007).
67. Fried, Promise 30 Years Later, supra note 65; Shiffrin, supra note 66, at 722–27 (arguing that the R
remedies to contract, if viewed a moral obligation, should include the possibility of punitive damages,
specific performance, and attorneys fees).
68. Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (2007).
69. Id. at 6–9.
70. Shiffrin, supra note 66. R
71. Id.
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Alternatively, contract scholars in the law and economics tradition have
tended to discount the moral force of a promise between the parties and have
focused more on the incomplete nature of contracts.72 Steven Shavell argues
that contracts are mostly incomplete in that they do not include contingen-
cies for most future states of the world.73 When contract breach occurs, the
implicit contingency statement is that the seller should perform unless the
costs to the seller are less than the value of the performance to the buyer.74
Any other rule, such as demanding performance as the default, does not
maximize the joint welfare of the parties because it requires the seller to
perform at a cost that is greater than the value of the performance to the
buyer. Instead, if the seller pays expectation damages, then the joint welfare
of the parties is maximized. Because a rule that permits breach if expectation
damages are paid produces the greatest joint welfare for the parties and com-
pensates the buyer’s injury, Shavell concludes that breach should not be con-
sidered immoral.75 Actual contract remedies are a better fit with this
rationale—the breached-upon party receives expectation damages and has an
obligation to mitigate its losses—although there are several arguments that
expectation damages may not fully compensate the breached-upon party.76
Under the law and economics rubric, remedy rules encourage optimal com-
pliance with contract rules: compliance when a breach would result in a net
loss to the parties, but breach when it produces a net benefit. That a party
has the option of breaching when there is a joint economic gain is uncon-
troversial, and there is not necessarily any social or moral opprobrium with
breach.77
An alternative way to construct a contract (if not an alternative approach
to contractual obligation) is to have the parties make the substance of the
contract an option of performance.78 The parties agree either to perform or
72. Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107
Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (2009); Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 Emory L.J. 439 (2006).
73. Shavell, Incompleteness of Contracts, supra note 72, at 1571–73. R
74. Id. at 1572.
75. Id. at 1579–80.
76. Fried, Convergence of Contract, supra note 68, at 6. Shavell and others in the law and economic R
tradition acknowledge these issues. See Shavell, Incompleteness of Contracts, supra note 72, at 1575. R
77. Compare Shiffrin, supra note 66, at 710 (“Morality classifies intentional promissory breach as a R
wrong that, in addition to requiring compensation, may merit punitive reactions, albeit some minor
ones; these may include proportionate expressions of reprobation, distrust, and self-inflicted reproofs,
such as guilt.”) with Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law 354 (2004) (“[Against the back-
ground of incomplete contracts that parties in fact make] breach is thus not an undesirable act but a
desirable, good act from the standpoint of the parties and their true wishes.”). There could be appropria-
tion assigned to the failure to pay expectation damages, however, because such actions would make one
party worse off (even if the breach remains Kaldor-Hicks efficient).
78. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Con-
tract Law, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1428 (2004). Scott and Triantis actually go further than acknowledging
that option contracts are a possibility. They argue that the best interpretation of contracts between
sophisticated parties is the frame of an option contract even if the contract is not structured specifically
that way. Id. But see Curtis Bridgeman & John C.P. Goldberg, Do Promises Distinguish Contract from Tort?,
44 Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (noting that even highly sophisticated parties may enter into
a contract where they understand performance, not compensation, to be legally binding).
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to pay a predetermined amount to forego performance. The choice between
performance and payment belongs to the parties. This approach blurs the
line between substantive contract terms and damages rules. One could inter-
pret a decision not to perform as a breach and the contractually-specified
remedy as the ex ante agreed compensation. Yet an equally natural reading
of the contract could be that both activities are consistent with the terms of
the contract: the decision not to perform is not a breach, but a valid comple-
tion of the contract. This reading questions what the first-order obligation
entails and broadens the scope of compliance with the contract to include
paying the agreed-upon sum. Here, second-order rules merge with first-or-
der rules (although they may remain distinct if the courts refuse to enforce
the ex ante remedy rules because the monetary option is viewed as puni-
tive).79 This is a distinction with a difference, though, because it speaks to
the agreement the parties have actually made and permits acts of non-per-
formance without an allegation of breach.80
In all of these approaches, remedies shape the audience’s view of the obli-
gation. The audience’s perception of the authority of the obligation will, to
some extent, reflect what the institution (here, contract law) says the conse-
quences of the breach should be. Remedies can price noncompliance not
only for the breached-upon party but also for the audience. Naturally, the
nature of the substantive obligations and the remedies can remain separate,
but it can be hard to maintain this distinction when one is well aware of the
remedy regimes. Contract law is sequenced such that rules regarding breach
(what qualifies as a breach) precede discussions of remedies, yet the knowl-
edge of the remedy rule is available and will influence perceptions of what
the nature of the obligation is.81
Debates regarding contracts are not so far removed from treaties. Treaties
are widely viewed as contracts between governments.82 The parties are able
to select the terms that they prefer, including remedies and exit options.83
Treaties obligate only those states that choose to sign them, affording parties
the ability to refuse to take on legal obligations. As with contracts, the
79. Shavell, supra note 77. R
80. Fried, Promise 30 Years Later, supra note 65. R
81. Taken a step further, limits on remedies may lead judges or adjudicators in other dispute resolu-
tion systems to redefine the meaning of contracts or statutes. Daryl Levinson demonstrates how limits on
a court’s ability to provide a remedy for constitutional deviations may lead judges to redefine the party’s
rights in a manner that fits the available set of remedies. Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 857 (1999). Levinson highlights how limits on remedies can redefine
judges’ views of protectable rights. This Article focuses on the influence of remedies on the obligatory
nature of the treaty regime, and thus on the reputational effects of breach, rather than the possibility that
the content of first-order rules could themselves be redefined.
82. Scholars often discuss treaty as a form of contract. See generally Goldsmith & Posner, The
Limits of International Law, supra note 1; Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note R
1. R
83. Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579 (2005); Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lip-
son, & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 Int’l Org. 761 (2001); Swaine,
supra note 25; Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1. R
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treaty regime is an institution whose terms will shape the audience’s view of
the obligation.
From the point of view of the contracting party’s reputation, the tradi-
tional view in international law is that all treaty obligations should be con-
sidered equally binding.84 The principle of pacta sunt servanda (treaties
should be obeyed) applies to all treaty obligations and generally matches the
“contract as a promise” approach.85 Thus a party to a treaty who breaches
any treaty agreement demonstrates a lack of respect for promises, which
carries across all treaty agreements.86 As result, the traditional view is that
breach in one issue area damages the party’s reputation for cooperativeness
in many, or all, issue areas.87
Treaties have historically not included remedies as part of the treaty text,
although many prominent treaty regimes now do. The entry of remedy re-
gimes, as part and parcel of broader dispute resolution institutions, will af-
fect the audience’s perception of the nature of the treaty obligation and the
reputational consequences of breach. This relationship can increase or de-
crease the audience’s perception of the mandatory nature of a treaty’s obliga-
tions. The argument of this Article is not that dispute resolution
institutions always lessen the reputational costs of treaty breach. A remedy
regime that provides for both compensatory and punitive damages can rein-
force the idea that the treaty obligation is a promise that should not be
breached.88 Dispute resolution institutions may impose sanctions (not
prices), and thus reinforce the audience’s beliefs regarding the mandatory
nature of the related treaty obligations.89 In these cases, remedies may actu-
ally increase the reputational costs of breach to the non-compliant party.
84. Some rules of international law may be more binding because they have become jus cogens norms
of international law, but this greater legal obligation derives from the jus cogens status not from the legal
obligations status as treaty law.
85. Eric Posner and Alan Sykes have recently argued that all treaties should be viewed under the
efficient breach lens. Alan O. Sykes & Eric A. Posner, Efficient Breach in International Law: Optimal Reme-
dies, “Legalized Noncompliance,” and Related Issues 110 Mich. L. Rev. 243 (2011). This Article does not
take a normative view of what the nature of treaty obligations should be. Rather, this Article explores
how the creation of dispute resolution institutions will likely influence the audience’s beliefs of the
nature of the obligations. This will depend, at least in part, on the broader legal context of the rule
included in the remedy regime. The audience’s understanding of whether the obligation is a normative
promise that cannot be broken or a political deal that can be cured through compensation will then
influence views of whether breach, in and of itself, is noncooperative and resulting in reputational loss.
86. For a critique of the view that breach necessarily means a lack of respect for law, see Brewster,
supra note 15; Jonathan Mercer, Reputation in International Politics (2010). R
87. See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2; Guzman, How International Law Works, supra R
note 1. For a critique of the view that reputation carries across issue areas, see Downs & Jones, supra note R
15. R
88. The general prohibition of punitive damages in contract law would not apply at the international
level. The parties can reach whatever terms they like and certainly can set the damages for breach at a
level that deters breach.
89. But see Scott & Stephan, The Limits of the Leviathan, supra note 1; Scott & Stephan, Self- R
Enforcing Agreements, supra note 1. R
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In some cases, dispute resolution regimes may lower the reputational
costs of treaty breach to states. Where treaty agreements set the remedies for
breach at compensation, the treaty negotiators recognize that the costs of
breach will sometimes be less than the breaching party’s gain from the
treaty deviation. If the remedy is not to deter or punish breach, but to com-
pensate those injured by the breach, then this becomes part of the audience’s
beliefs concerning the political deal embodied by the treaty. The remedy
regime itself represents the parties’ view of the treaty—the parties do not
wish to deter a breach of the agreement’s obligations in each and every cir-
cumstance. The parties may prefer compliance, but only up to a certain
point—the point at which the costs of deviation (set out by the remedy
regime) outweigh the benefits of the deviation.
Such a remedy regime will influence the audience’s view of the mandatory
nature of the treaty’s substantive obligations. In these cases, the audience
may see noncompliance as priced into the treaty. Alternatively, the audience
may believe that treaties with their own remedy regimes function as option
contracts. This goes to the heart of the question of what states have agreed
to when they sign treaties. Have they promised to adopt policies that con-
form to the policy terms of the treaty, or have they only promised to provide
a set level of compensation? Compliance may still be preferred, but the audi-
ence’s view of the compulsory nature of the treaty’s substantive obligations
will be influenced by the remedy regime.
Where remedies are compensatory, rather than deterring, a dispute reso-
lution system may lower the reputational costs of deviations to the breach-
ing state. There may be some reputational loss to the state from breach
where the remedy regime seems to permit breach, or at least where the
remedy is not set at a level that would deter breach. Breach may still be
perceived as less cooperative than compliance, even if the breaching party
abides by the remedy rules. But the argument here is that reputational costs
are lower in these cases than if the treaty did not have a dispute settlement
institution. The reputational costs of breaching a treaty are lower if the
treaty includes a dispute resolution system and compensatory remedies than
if the treaty does not include them.90
A. Crowding Out Informal Remedies
Feedback effects between the creation of formal remedies and parties’ be-
liefs about the binding effect of rules can be observed in studies of how
penalties alter the audience’s perception of the original agreement. The in-
creasingly robust literature on “crowding out” discusses how imposing for-
mal sanctions can have a negative effect on the application of informal
90. The opposite effect can also occur: if the dispute settlement system has “high” remedies that
eliminate any gain from breach or include punitive damages, then the reputational costs of breach may
also be higher. In these cases, dispute resolution institutions may better deter breaches.
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sanctions.91 Bruno Frey and others have demonstrated that the addition of
formal remedies can lead the audience to rely on these remedies exclusively,
and thereby decrease the use of informal remedies, such as reputation and
reciprocity. This literature highlights how external motivation can influence
intrinsic motivation. For instance, adding a monetary reward for an activity
can reduce a population’s willingness to engage in the activity.92
This is true for monetary punishments as well. Even if there are very few
formal consequences to breach (as there have traditionally been in interna-
tional law), the addition of a formal punishment such as a monetary punish-
ment can decrease compliance with the rule rather than raise it. In their
study of the behavior of the parents of children attending ten daycare centers
in Israel, Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini found that the imposition of a
monetary fine actually increased the number of breaches observed, in com-
parison to the initial situation of no fines.93 In their study, Gneezy and
Rustichini observed the incidence of parents picking up their children after
the centers’ hours of operation had ended for the day. Parents were occasion-
ally late in retrieving their children, but incidences of lateness were low,
with about ten late parents per week per daycare center (each center had an
average of thirty-three children). There was initially no fine or other formal
sanction for a late pick-up. As directed by Gneezy and Rustichini, six of the
daycare centers established a system of fines to be levied when parents failed
to pick up their children on time. The number of incidences of late pick-ups
rose at these centers to about twenty late pick-ups per week. In contrast,
there was not a significant change in the control group of the four daycare
centers that continued not to impose any fines.
The conclusion of this study is that parents made use of the system of
fines to increase the hours of childcare available to them. The fines were
clearly not sufficiently high to achieve the goal of decreasing the rate of late
pick-ups. That the rate of late pick-ups increased after the system of fines was
imposed suggests that formal rules decreased the pre-existing informal sanc-
tions for lateness. Under the previous system, parents did not pay fines even
though they bore certain informal sanctions, such as guilt for imposing a
burden on the daycare center’s personnel and perhaps a reputational loss
with the daycare center. If the fines simply reflected an additional penalty
91. See Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey & Steffen Huck, More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement,
Trust, and Crowding, 95 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 131, 132 (2001); Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The
Costs of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding Out, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. 746, 747
(1997); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and
Organizational Cultures, 20 J.L. & Econ. 390, 391 (1994); Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds
out Civic Virtues, 107 Econ. J. 1043, 1044 (1997); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J.
Legal Stud. 1, 1 (2000).
92. Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 91, at 747–50 (discussing how residents were less willing to R
accept a waste dump in their community when they were offered monetary compensation); for a survey of
similar studies, see Edward Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of Experi-
ments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 Psych. Bull. 627 (1999).
93. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 91, at 1. R
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added to the penalties of informal sanctions, then the overall level of penal-
ties for late pick-ups should have increased, and the rate of parent breach
should have decreased. The fact that the rate of parent breach increased sug-
gests (but does not conclusively prove) that the actual level of penalties de-
creased with the imposition of the fine. Once the parents were required to
pay a fine, some of the parents (though not necessarily all of the parents)
faced lower actual sanctions, and thus breached more frequently. Although
we cannot know what the parents’ decisionmaking process was, the most
intuitive explanation is that some of the parents altered their beliefs about
how “mandatory” it was to pick up their children on time. The obligation
was less binding because they had the option to “pay for” deviations from
the rule.94 If the rule was not mandatory, then the informal sanctions de-
creased as well. Parents may have expected a lower reputational loss with the
daycare center and may have felt less guilt about being late. This study
suggests that there is a feedback effect between the imposition of remedies,
understandings of the rule, and the effectiveness of informal sanctions in
promoting compliance. The imposition of formal sanctions revised the par-
ents’ understanding of the daycare center’s policy, undermined the system of
informal sanctions, and, at least at the level of fines used in the experiment,
resulted in a lower overall level of sanctions from the perspective of the
parents.95
The crowding out literature speaks directly to the design of remedies even
at the international level. Iris Bohnet, Bruno Frey, and Steffen Huck argue
that, with regard to legal rules, having “medium levels of enforcement”—
some formal remedies, but at levels insufficient to deter breach—is the
worst possible outcome in terms of compliance.96 In an experimental set-
ting, the authors found that when there was no formal enforcement of an
agreement, participants relied heavily on informal remedies to enforce con-
tracts. The participants were careful in choosing partners and thus formed
more contracts with other participants with a preference for keeping
94. It is also consistent with economic and legal analyses of the commodification of certain public-
regarding actions. Public organizations, such as the Red Cross (which receives blood donations) or groups
encouraging organ donation, often resist efforts to offer financial compensation for donations. There are
many concerns with financial compensation for these types of donations, including the exploitation of the
poor. But one major concern is a decrease in the level of donations from individuals who do not need such
compensation. See generally Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship (1970). So long as blood or
organ donations are viewed as altruistic, the donor (or the donor’s family) receives some psychic benefits
from the gift. If the donation were given a price, this could actually decrease the number of donations,
since the formal benefits, or the price for the donations, would reduce the informal benefits to the point
where the overall benefit of donation would be lower for many members of the population. This could
occur because the individuals considering making donations (or at least some of them) would alter their
beliefs regarding the benefits of the action.
95. In another interesting twist, the experiment removed the system of fines to see if the incidence of
parent breaches would return to the earlier level. The level of breach remained at the higher level that
existed under the system of fines. One interpretation of this result is that once parents altered their
beliefs regarding the existence of informal sanctions, these beliefs were difficult to shift back. Other
interpretations are obviously viable as well. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 91, at 8. R
96. Bohnet, Frey & Huck, supra note 91, at 138–42. R
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promises. When formal sanctions were available, parties substantially de-
creased their use of informal remedies and relied instead upon the remedies
provided by the legal system. This did not result in a lower rate of contract
performance so long as remedies were high enough to deter defection.
Where remedies were set at a medium level, however, the rate of contract
breach increased.97 The formal remedies crowded out the informal remedies
as participants put their trust in the legal system rather than screening the
other participants.98 The decline of informal remedies led to an increase in
the incidence of breach because the formal remedies were not sufficient to
support cooperation with this pool of contracting parties. Thus, the authors
argue that “[t]he worst legal regime is not one in which contracts cannot be
enforced but one with an intermediate level of enforceability.”99
While the authors do not use the term “reputation” to describe the infor-
mal remedies, their description of how participants look for signals of trust-
worthiness in other participants matches the informational function of
reputation. The hardening of enforcement mechanisms by establishing for-
mal adjudication or explicit remedies does not necessarily prove additive to
informal reputational enforcement mechanisms. Instead, formal remedies
may crowd out the use of reputational mechanisms, leading to lower con-
tract performance under certain formal remedy regimes.
International law studies have generally ignored the possibility of formal
remedies crowding out informal remedies. The primary exception is Robert
Scott and Paul Stephan, who argue that the creation of courts with formal
enforcement power decreases the state’s reliance on reciprocity and reputa-
tion.100 Scott and Stephan argue that the growth of a specific kind of inter-
national dispute resolution crowds out the effects of reciprocity and
reputation in international law. The dispute resolution systems that the au-
thors discuss are institutions that have two characteristics: broad standing
rules, including standing for individuals as well as states, and the capacity to
assign and enforce remedies on their own. Scott and Stephan argue that
these institutions, which are often, but not exclusively, domestic courts, can
decrease parties’ willingness to act in a good-faith manner with one another.
Instead, the parties rely on the court system and are less vested in their own
relationship.
The authors highlight that the move to such formal dispute resolution
systems can be less efficient than a system of informal dispute resolution. To
the extent that the parties can monitor and enforce the agreement on their
own, an informal system is both cheaper (not requiring a legal system) and
more accurate (relying on observable rather than verifiable information). Yet
97. Id.
98. Id. at 136.
99. Id.
100. Scott & Stephan, The Limits of the Leviathan, supra note 1, at 4; Scott & Stephan, Self- R
Enforcing Agreements, supra note 1, at 554. R
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there are circumstances where an informal enforcement system will not be
effective and a formal system is necessary to support the agreement. Where
the agreement involves significant sunk costs by one party or where the
information needed to detect defections from the agreements is hard to ob-
serve, then the parties will need to create a dispute resolution system to
address these hurdles to cooperation.
Scott and Stephan’s argument is both positive and normative. They argue
that the situations in which we observe such formal dispute resolution sys-
tems match these conditions. Thus, governments have implicitly recognized
that formal dispute resolution is only necessary in certain issue areas and
have made use of formal dispute resolution systems only when the correct
circumstances exist. Normatively, they argue that efforts to increase or de-
crease the legalization of international law in all areas is counterproductive
because it can result in sub-optimal enforcement regimes in many areas. If
informal dispute resolution can provide cheaper and more accurate resolu-
tion of parties’ disputes, then efforts to establish formal dispute resolution
systems will lead to worse conditions for cooperation. At the same time,
scholars who oppose the creation of international courts with broad standing
rules and independent remedial power in all (or most) situations fail to rec-
ognize the functional benefits of establishing these institutions.
This Article builds on Scott and Stephan’s novel application of the crowd-
ing out literature and expands the theoretical range of this phenomenon in
international law. Scott and Stephan’s work can be framed as an example of a
much larger understanding of how informal and formal remedies interact in
a highly formalized legal system. This Article broadens this view by demon-
strating that the interaction between formal and informal remedies is influ-
enced by a host of design elements. The relationship between the design of
the treaty and informal sanctions is multifaceted. It encompasses the sub-
stantive provisions of a treaty agreement (the form of the treaty’s regulation)
and the structure of formal remedies, not just the structure of the legal
system.
This Article also explores why Scott and Stephan’s view that formal dis-
pute resolution will always crowd out informal remedies may be overly pes-
simistic. If the remedies are structured as sanctions, rather than prices,
formal dispute resolution may be able to “crowd in” reputational costs (if
not reciprocity), even if administered through a highly formalized legal sys-
tem. In addition, the analysis of formal and informal remedies need not be
limited to institutions with broad standing rules and the ability to impose
their own remedies—a definition that excludes many of the most important
dispute resolution systems. Rather, this approach to enforcement is relevant
to any system that has formal remedies. This Article provides a framework
for this analysis and expands the range of international enforcement systems
Scott and Stephan discuss to the far larger universe of treaties and interna-
tional interactions.
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III. Formal Remedies in International Economic Law
Dispute resolution systems do not need to include explicit remedy re-
gimes. Governments designing a dispute resolution institution can opt to
include a remedy element, clarifying what consequences come from breach
or continued breach, or they can remain silent on the question of reme-
dies.101 Some international agreements include explicit remedy regimes.102
The Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) in the WTO details what
remedies are available in the case of breach.103 Most of the hundreds of bilat-
eral investment treaty regimes include agreements that provide the opportu-
nity for monetary damages and rules for calculating those damages.104
Human rights treaties also sometimes include explicit remedy provisions.
The treaty creating the Inter-American Human Rights Court provides the
Court with the authority to award remedies to complaining parties against
respondent governments. Tribunals may also develop their own jurispru-
dence on remedies. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) has
treaty authority to award remedies, but has also developed its own doctrines
concerning the types of remedies to be awarded.105
This section examines the interaction between formal sanctions and
reputational concerns in international economic agreements. This section
first discusses the WTO’s dispute resolution system and then considers bi-
lateral investment treaties. In both cases, the remedy regimes are prices
rather than sanctions under Cooter’s framework. This section examines how
a state’s willingness to pay damages alters the audience’s perception of its
cooperativeness with the economic regime.
A. Dispute Resolution at the WTO
The WTO has perhaps the most well-known dispute resolution process.
The WTO Agreements include the DSU, which provides the dispute settle-
ment system with compulsory jurisdiction over all WTO complaints (only
states can bring complaints) and the authority to interpret the WTO Agree-
101. See Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and Developing
Country Interests, Report Commissioned by the World Bank 7 (1999), available at http://www.econ-law.
se/Papers/Remedies%20990611-1.pdf (noting that “[the absence of explicit remedies in treaties] is not
an anomaly. It is often the case that drafters of a treaty leave to the discretion of the adjudicating body to
recommend the appropriate remedy”).
102. Born, supra note 29, at 819–67 (detailing the growth of international adjudication institutions, R
particularly in international economic law).
103. Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 Eur.
J. Int’l L. 763, 763 (2000).
104. Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before Bilateral
Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1550, 1551–52 (2009).
105. Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Struc-
tural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19 Eur. J. Int’l L. 125, 128 (2008).
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ments.106 The DSU also provides a set of explicit remedies. If a state
breaches a WTO obligation and does not come into compliance within a
reasonable period of time after the ruling, then the complaining state can
impose its own trade barriers on the breaching state up to the level of the
complaing state’s current injury.107 The formal remedy alone is not suffi-
cient to deter deviations—the remedy does not necessarily eliminate the
state’s gains from the breach. Rather, the remedy seems a rough approxima-
tion of American contract law’s remedy regime—providing the breached-
upon state with the power to raise its own barriers to trade only to the
extent that it has lost access to the foreign market. WTO remedies differ
from those of American contract law, however, in that they do not provide
any remedy for the harm caused by breach if the respondent state decides to
“perform” by altering its policies to comply with the regime.108
The DSU underscores that the purpose of the dispute settlement mecha-
nism is to resolve disputes, not necessarily to effect compliance with trade
rules.109 The dispute resolution system states a preference for mutually
agreeable settlements that are “consistent with the [WTO] agreements,”
but clearly leaves room for mutually agreeable solutions that are not.110 In-
deed, before a member brings a case for the breach of trade rules, the agree-
ment counsels that the state should not just consider the legal merits of the
case, but also “exercise its judgment as to whether action under [dispute
resolution] procedures would be fruitful.”111
1. The Structure of the Remedy
Under the Cooter framework, the WTO system is a pricing system rather
than a sanctioning system because it assigns a remedy based on the level of
harm rather than the level of sanctions needed for deterrence.112 Where par-
ties cannot reach a mutually acceptable resolution of a dispute on their own,
the WTO system provides for third-party adjudication of the dispute.113 If
the respondent state is found to be in breach of trade rules, the DSU system
establishes a preference for compliance with the legal ruling, but provides
remedies if compliance is not forthcoming. If the respondent state fails to
106. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 1.1, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401
[hereinafter WTO DSU] (stating that dispute settlement rules apply to any dispute between members
concerning their rights and obligations under the WTO agreement); WTO DSU art. 3.1 (affirming the
members’ agreement to adhere to the rules of the DSU).
107. Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S180–81. R
108. Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement, 80
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 102, 109–11 (2011) [hereinafter Remedy Gap].
109. The DSU explicitly identifies the “aim of dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute.”
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, supra note 47. R
113. WTO DSU arts. 4.7, 6.
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withdraw the measure that breaches trade rules, the complaining state can
suspend trade concessions to a level “equivalent to the level of the nullifica-
tion or impairment [from the trade violation].”114 The remedy is static as to
the level of harm: the remedy award does not increase if the respondent state
fails to comply or if the respondent state intended to breach international
trade rules. Punitive damages are never permitted.115
The WTO arbitration panels, which are responsible for calculating the
level of the suspension of concessions, have similarly embraced the level-of-
harm view of trade remedies, rather than the deterrence view. The calcula-
tion of the suspension award is based on the trade flows lost to the com-
plaining state, not the benefits to the respondent state.116 In addition, the
panels have explicitly rejected the idea that the suspension of concessions
should be calibrated to the level necessary to secure compliance.117 For in-
stance, in the arbitration between the United States and the European Com-
munities regarding compliance with the WTO’s Bananas decision, the panel
highlighted that, while the purpose of the suspension of trade concessions
was to induce compliance, “this purpose does not mean that the [Dispute
Settlement Body] should grant authorization to suspend concessions beyond
what is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.”118 The panel
further determined that punitive damages were similarly unavailable as a
remedy under the WTO system.119 The WTO system works effectively like
a contract law system, providing damages to make the injured party whole,
but the remedies are, in many cases, insufficient to eliminate the gains from
breach.
In addition, the DSU specifically requires that the dispute resolution sys-
tem be exclusive of some informal remedies. States cannot act reciprocally in
international trade—engaging in tit-for-tat behavior—outside of the WTO
dispute resolution system. To engage in any in-kind actions, states must
proceed through the DSU system, limiting any reciprocal actions to those
specifically authorized by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.120 The WTO
dispute resolution system has taken a narrow view of even otherwise legal
actions that are reciprocal actions for suspected breaches of trade rules. In
European Communities—Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, a WTO
114. WTO DSU art. 22.4 (“The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized
by the [Dispute Settlement Body] shall be equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment.”).
115. Horn & Mavroidis, supra note 101, at 22. R
116. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/ARB1 & WT/
DS267/ARB2 (Aug. 31, 2009).
117. See also David Palmeter & Stanimir A. Alexandrov, “Inducing Compliance” in WTO Dispute Settle-
ment, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E.
Hudec 646, 646–47 (Daniel L.M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002); Andrew Mitchell, Pro-
portionality and Remedies Under WTO Law, 17 Eur. J. of Int’l L. 985, 999 (2006).
118. Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Sale, Importation and Distribution of Bananas—
Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of the DSU, ¶ 6.3, WT/DS27/ARB/
ECU (Mar. 24, 2000).
119. Id.
120. WTO DSU art. 23.
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panel examined whether an allowable subsidy offer by the European Union
(“EU”) was a breach of trade rules because the subsidy was adopted in re-
sponse to an alleged South Korean breach of trade law.121 The panel found
that the EU actions were contrary to trade rules, even if they were otherwise
legal as a subsidy, because such actions were an attempt to enforce trade rule
outside of the DSU system.122 In so doing, the panel interpreted the WTO
Agreement as condemning any attempts by member states to use in-kind
reciprocity as an addition to the formal remedies offered by the DSU.
Whether the fundamental legal obligation of the WTO regime is compli-
ance with the treaty’s substantive rules or is a contract law-type system is
the basis for the disagreement between John Jackson, on the one hand, and
Warren Schwartz and Alan Sykes, on the other.123Jackson argues that gov-
ernments have a legal obligation under the DSU to comply with the WTO’s
substantive obligations.124 For him, the remedies established by the DSU are
not an alternative to compliance, but are penalties levied if legal obligations
are not satisfied.125 Schwartz and Sykes argue that governments’ obligations
are more passive and extend only as far as accepting the rebalance of trade
concessions if a government opts not to comply.126 Notably, they rely in part
on the nature of the remedies to support their position. They argue that the
structure of the agreement is itself conclusive: “[w]e simply note that the
provisions of the DSU, taken as a whole, allow a violator to continue a
violation in perpetuity, as long as it compensates or is willing to bear the
costs of the retaliatory suspension of concessions.”127
Much of this debate can be reduced to a question of whether the WTO
permits governments to escape from their obligations. The idea of an escape
clause is already commonly used to explain the WTO’s Safeguard Agree-
ment.128 This idea, as formulated by legal scholars and political scientists, is
121. Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, WT/DS301/R
(June 20, 2005).
122. Id. ¶¶ 7.187–216.
123. Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 Am. J. Int’l L.
416, 416 (1996); John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstanding on the
Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 60, 60–61 (1997); Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach of
Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?, in New Di-
rections in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson, 347–57
(Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
124. Jackson, supra note 123, at 60–61. R
125. Id. at 61.
126. Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S181. See also Bello, supra note 123; Sykes, supra  note 123. R
127. Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 1, at S191. This raises the interesting possibility that the treaty R
designers may purposely devise formal remedies to be too low to deter breach, relying on reputational
losses to supplement the formal sanctions and thus raise the overall level of sanctions to the appropriate
level. In choosing lower sanctions, however, the treaty designers may undermine the reputational costs of
breach. Treaty members and the larger international audience may understand the treaty differently and
view the low sanctions as a statement that the treaty’s provisions are not intended to be mandatory.
128. See, e.g., Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard,” supra note 12; Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 12; R
see also Krzysztof J. Pelc, Seeking Escape: Escape Clauses in International Trade Agreements, 53 Int’l Stud. Q.
349, 349 (2009).
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that the parties to an agreement will recognize in negotiations that there
will be certain situations in which governments will wish to deviate from
the Agreement.129 The Safeguard Agreement sets out the conditions for
these deviations ex ante. Dispute resolution, in contrast, can function as an
ex post escape clause.130 For instance, the WTO’s DSU does not attempt to
detail ex ante the situations under which states are explicitly permitted to
deviate from trade rules, but instead assigns a certain penalty when they do.
The goal of this paper is not to resolve this debate but to emphasize how
dispute resolution institutions can alter the beliefs of some or all members of
the audience. If there is reasonable disagreement over whether the DSU per-
mits escape, then at least some international actors will alter their expecta-
tions about what set of actions qualify as “cooperative” if the state follows
the WTO’s remedy regime.
2. Community Response to the Use of WTO Remedies
In addition to the structure of the remedy, we can observe the audience’s
response to WTO remedies. The international trade system does not often
resort to the use of formal remedies. Less than a dozen cases have actually
resulted in the WTO-authorized suspension of trade concessions.131 Yet the
available remedies inform much of the bargaining that takes place regarding
compliance. Parties regularly bargain to mutually agreed resolutions of dis-
putes that are less than full compliance.132
Most relevant to the question of informal sanctions is how the other
member states respond to the use of formal sanctions. Is the suspension of
concessions a complement or a substitute for informal sanction? This analy-
sis goes beyond Cooter’s framework and attempts to gauge the audience’s
reaction directly. Determining audience reaction is difficult, as we cannot
directly observe how the views of members of the trade community change
after a dispute, but member states’ public reactions to the use of formal
remedies can be illuminating. In a sanctioning regime, we would expect
that a dispute would lead to greater community costs. A successful case
would encourage other nations to similarly condemn the breaching state’s
actions and restrict their dealings with the breaching state. If the respondent
state continued to refuse to comply with the ruling, the informal sanctions
on the breaching state would increase. By contrast, a pricing regime would
limit the community response to the formal remedy offered to the com-
129. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”, supra note 12, at 258–259; Rosendorff & Milner, supra note R
12, at 829; see also Krzysztof, supra note 128. R
130. See Brewster, Remedy Gap, supra note 108, at 125–27. R
131. William Davey, Implementation in WTO Dispute Settlement: An Introduction to the Problems and Possi-
ble Solutions, RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-013 (2005), at 12 (discussing the infrequent use of
sanctions in the implementation of WTO dispute settlement reports).
132. See generally Davey, supra note 131 (addressing case studies in which parties engage in bargaining R
for the settlement of disputes).
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plaining party. Continued refusal to comply with the trade rule would not
lead to escalating informal sanctions.
In most cases, WTO remedies function as a price regime approach would
predict. The trade remedies act as parameters within which parties may bar-
gain over levels of compensation. Once the parties reach an agreement based
on those parameters, the case is considered concluded even if compliance is
not forthcoming. Furthermore, the continued existence of a breach of trade
rules does not result in additional litigation by other parties who would have
standing to bring a claim. The lack of additional litigation by third parties
is particularly interesting because there is not an explicit settlement of the
claim with regard to these states.
For instance, in the European Communities—Hormones case, the United
States and Canada brought a complaint against the EU based on its ban on
the import of beef treated with growth hormones.133 The panel and WTO
Appellate Body found that this ban was a breach of international trade rules,
largely because of the lack of scientific evidence supporting the European
claim that the meat posed a hazard to human health.134 The EU refused to
remove the ban, and the WTO authorized the United States and Canada to
suspend trade concessions equaling USD 116 million and CAD 11.3 mil-
lion, respectively.135 The United States and Canada did suspend concessions
but ultimately reached an agreement with the EU that permitted the hor-
mone ban to remain in place.136 The EU offered both states additional duty-
free access for non-hormone-treated beef and the parties notified the WTO
that they had reached a mutually acceptable settlement.137 The parties are
treating the matter as final even though the illegal measure remains in
place. Other members of the WTO also seem to accept the settlement as
final. No other beef producing states have brought a claim against the EU,
including Australia and New Zealand, who were third parties to the original
case.
Some WTO disputes are truly priced in the sense that they are resolved
through an exchange of cash. In United States—Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, the European Communities filed a complaint regarding the
United States’ failure to require the payment of royalties for music played in
some commercial venues.138 The European Communities alleged that the
breach was due to an exemption in the U.S. copyright law, which made U.S.
law inconsistent with the WTO’s Trade Related Intellectual Property
133. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
134. Id.
135. Daniel Pruzin, EU, Canada Announce Provisional Deal to End Dispute on Hormone-Treated Beef, BNA
WTO Reporter, Mar. 22, 2011.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Panel Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15,
2000).
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Agreement.139 Five states—Japan, Canada, Australia, Brazil, and Switzer-
land—joined the dispute as third parties.140 The panel that heard the case
found in favor of the European Communities, and the United States decided
not to appeal the decision.141 Instead, the United States agreed to arbitrate
the amount of the injury to the European Communities from the breach.142
The arbitration panel found that the European losses from the American
breach were EUR 1.2 million annually.143 Bargaining around that figure,
the United States and the European Communities agreed to a payment of
USD 3.3 million over three years to resolve the dispute, and the parties
notified the WTO that they had a mutually acceptable temporary resolu-
tion.144 The United States has not made any additional payments after the
three years and has not altered Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act to
cure the breach of trade rules.145
While the legal status of the case remains open, politically, the case re-
mains effectively settled. Once the United States and the European Commu-
nities reached an agreement, none of the third parties or any other member
states affected by the breach brought a case against the United States. Al-
though other states could bring WTO litigation with the aim of receiving
similar monetary compensation, no other members of the international trade
community have sought to impose sanctions or seek compensation from the
United States. In addition, the European Communities have effectively
treated the matter as settled. The United States has not made any payments
to the European Communities since 2004 and the European Communities
have not renewed their compliant or requested the suspension of trade con-
cessions due to the on-going trade breach.
Similarly, in the United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton case, the Brazil-
ian government brought a complaint alleging that the United States was
subsidizing cotton production in breach of trade rules. Seventeen other
members joined the case as third parties.146 Both the panel and the Appel-
late Body found that the U.S. subsidies were illegal, and recommended that
the United States withdraw these measures. After the United States failed to
withdraw the contested subsidies, the Brazilian government requested the
139. Id. ¶ 3.1.
140. Id. ¶ 1.4.
141. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Will not Appeal WTO Panel Ruling Striking Down U.S. Music Licensing Law,
BNA WTO Reporter, July 28, 2000.
142. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Finally Moves to Pay EU Musicians in Fund Settling WTO Licensing Spat, BNA
WTO Reporter, May 14, 2003.
143. Article 25 Arbitration Report, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/
ARB25/1 (Nov. 9, 2001).
144. Notification of Mutually Acceptable Temporary Arrangement, United States—Section 110(5) of
the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/23 (June 23, 2003) See also Bernard O’Connor and Margareta
Djordjevic, Practical Aspects of Monetary Compensation: The US–Copyright Case, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 127,
128 (2005) (discussing the case and its settlement).
145. O’Connor & Djordjevic, supra note 144, at 130. R
146. The members were Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chad, China, Chinese Taipei, the EU,
India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, Japan, and Thailand.
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suspension of concessions, and a WTO arbitration panel created a formula
for determining the level of suspension, which permitted the suspension of
USD 294.7 million in trade flows for 2009.147 The United States and Brazil
then reached a separate agreement in which the United States would main-
tain its subsidies, but provide Brazil with USD 147 million a year to refrain
from exercising its right to suspend concessions.148 As of this writing, the
agreement resolving the dispute continues to govern the parties. Moreover,
none of the other seventeen states that joined the dispute as third parties,
including some other major cotton producers, has brought another case
against the United States in spite of the fact that its trade-law-inconsistent
policies remain in effect.149
Although it is impossible to rule out the possibility that the United
States suffers informal costs from its continued breach, there is little evi-
dence that the WTO system encourages the use of informal remedies. The
WTO system explicitly restricts the ability of member states to supplement
formal remedies with in-kind reciprocity. The dispute resolution system also
seems to resolve the controversy, not only for the complaining state, but also
for other states that may have similar claims. While it is very difficult to
measure reputational gain and loss, we would expect some public statements
objecting to the settlements that leave the breach in place; however, we do
not observe this. If there are such objections, they have not been particularly
loud. Indeed, public officials have embraced the WTO remedies as a price
paradigm. Pascal Lamy (now the Director-General of the WTO), while act-
ing as Trade Commissioner of the European Communities, described WTO
dispute resolution as such: “[so] long as you pay the penalties, you can go on
as you are.”150 Rufus Yerxa, while acting as a U.S. trade official, stated that
the WTO dispute settlement system was designed to mimic contractual
remedies and not necessarily to demand compliance.151 This indicates, but
does not prove, that the audience understands the WTO to be the type of
agreement in which the payment of remedies is consistent with cooperative
behavior.
147. See Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/ARB/1 & WT/DS267/
ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009).
148. Ed Taylor, Brazil Suspends Sanctions Against U.S. Until 2012 in WTO Cotton Subsidy Dispute, BNA
WTO Reporter, June 18, 2010.
149. See, e.g., Charan Devereaux et al., Case Studies in US Trade Negotiation, Vol. 2: Resolv-
ing Disputes 235–82 (2006) (introducing a case study of the U.S.-Brazil cotton dispute and discussing
why West African states did not join as complaining parties).
150. Press and Communication Service Brussels, No. 3036, May 23, 2000, quoted in Petros C. Mav-
roidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 763, 808
(2000).
151. Rufus Yerxa, The Power of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, in Key Issues in the WTO Set-
tlement System: The First Ten Years 3, 4 (Rufus Yerxa & Bruce Wilson eds., 2005).
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B. Bilateral Investment Treaties
Bilateral investment treaties are structured similarly to option contracts.
The treaties are agreements that foreign investment will be welcomed in
both states.152 The treaties normally contain a number of provisions regard-
ing investment, including descriptions of what capital measures are prohib-
ited (rules against repatriation of capital and rules requiring local content in
a production process) as well as a list of industries in which the state plans to
maintain restrictions on foreign investment.153 Yet the core obligation of
most bilateral investment treaties is the promise to pay prompt, adequate,
and full compensation if the host government expropriates investment.154
This core obligation is structured as an option contract in the sense that the
government does not promise to refrain from expropriating the investment
for a public purpose, but rather promises to provide compensation if it
does.155 Consequently, the decision of a state to expropriate property for a
public purpose is not itself a breach of the substantive terms of the treaty.
For instance, the United States can continue to take property for a public
purpose under the bilateral investment treaty without breaching any of the
investment treaties it has signed. The breach occurs only if the state fails to
pay prompt, adequate, and effective compensation.156
To be clear, the state may be breaching its promise to the investor.157 A
firm and the government may enter into a detailed agreement regarding the
terms of a firm’s proposed investment. For instance, a firm offering to make
a large investment may receive a favorable tax rate or the government may
152. Often investment provisions are incorporated as part of a bilateral or regional trade agreement.
The investment provisions in these agreements generally mimic the terms of the bilateral investment
treaties. See Kenneth Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 U. C. Davis J.
Int’l L. & Pol. 157, 179–80 (2005–06).
153. See generally Andreas Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (2010).
154. Many capital exporting states argue that this is the minimum standard of treatment for foreign
investment that customary international law requires. What customary law requires is controversial.
Over the last century, many developing states have contested the claim that customary international law
requires compensation. See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 153. More recently, the question of whether R
the network of bilateral investment treaties has created new customary international law is also contested.
Commentators argue that there are now thousands of bilateral investment treaties and that this should
qualify both as state practice and as evidence of opinio juris. See, e.g., Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging
Global Regime for Investment, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 427, 428–29 (2010). Yet there is a difference between
what concessions states are willing to bargain for and what they have a legal obligation to provide as a
matter of law. In addition, what qualifies as state practice depends on one’s view of the absolute number
of BITS in existence or the practice of the international system as a whole. The number of bilateral
investment treaties in existence—hundreds—is a small proportion of the number of possible bilateral
treaties that could exist in the international system. The failure of multilateral investment treaty negotia-
tions further casts doubt on the idea that bilateral treaties reflect a consistent state practice.
155. 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/117601.pdf. The right of the government to control the territory within one’s state is considered not
only a key sovereign right but also a necessary characteristic of statehood.
156. See generally Lowenfeld, supra note 153. R
157. See generally Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign Investors Before
Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1550 (2009) [hereinafter Webb
Yackee, State Promises].
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promise to build the local infrastructure necessary for the investment’s suc-
cess.158 Where the government fails to maintain its agreement, arbitration
panels (relying on either bilateral investment agreements or customary in-
ternational law) have found that the state has breached its agreement with
the firm.159 Yet the host state’s decision to breach a promise to the investor
does not necessarily breach the host state’s promise in the investment treaty
to the investor’s home state. The bilateral investment treaty only demands
that the host state take the property for a public purpose and compensate
the investor. So long as the host state pays fair compensation in a prompt
manner, then the terms of the agreement are met.
Bilateral investment treaties have garnered significant scholarly attention
and popular criticism within the last decade for a variety of reasons. First, it
is unclear whether these agreements provide mutual benefits to the parties
or, in contrast, whether they are fundamentally harmful to developing
states.160 Many scholars question whether bilateral investment treaties actu-
ally increase foreign direct investment to developing countries.161 Along
similar lines, arbitration panels have tended to interpret the agreements
with an investor-friendly slant, frequently finding that any change in the
regulatory or tax treatment of a foreign investment is a form of expropria-
tion.162 Such regulatory takings are different from the “classic” expropria-
tion cases, in which the government seizes control of a foreign natural
resource extraction project (for example, oil or copper) and takes the reve-
nues from the project as its own without compensation.163 In a regulatory
taking—or “creeping” expropriation—case, the government is not directly
profiting from the expropriation in the sense that it is not taking the reve-
nues from a project that the foreign investor would otherwise enjoy.164 The
government may benefit from greater political support due to higher regula-
tory standards popular among key constituencies, but the government in
these cases does not have the intent to seize the foreign property and gain
the revenue from the investment for itself.165 The idea that regulatory ac-
158. See generally Debra Spar, Attracting High Technology Investment: Intel’s Costa Rica Plant, Foreign
Investment Advisory Service Occassional Paper 11 (1998).
159. See Webb Yackee, State Promises, supra note 157. R
160. See generally Andrew Guzman, Why do LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 Va. J. Int’l L. 639 (1998) [hereinafter Guzman, LDCs].
161. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Are BITs Such a Bright Idea? Exploring the Ideational Basis of Invest-
ment Treaty Enthusiasm, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Policy 1550 (2005); Guzman, LDCs, supra note
160; Salacuse, supra note 154 (noting that BITS are built on the assumption that the developing country R
will benefit from increased foreign direct investment but acknowledging that this assumption has not
been empirically demonstrated in a robust fashion).
162. See generally Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30
(2003).
163. See generally Raymon Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (1971).
164. Id.
165. See generally Been & Beauvais, supra note 162; Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID R
Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000) (bad government motive not needed to find expropriation).
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tions can be takings for the purposes of an investment treaty is controversial
with the governments of developed states because it exposes them to inves-
tor liability for common regulatory actions, such as environmental regula-
tions or local zoning ordinances.166
Second, bilateral investment treaties are unique among international eco-
nomic agreements in that private investors have standing to sue the host
country government.167 In almost all other international economic agree-
ments, governments serve as gatekeepers for international litigation.168 The
expansion of standing to individual investors allows private actors to file
claims, even when their home governments would not do so for diplomatic
or other reasons. Moreover, the judgments of the arbitration panel are gener-
ally enforceable anywhere the host government has assets. This combination
of the freedom to bring suits without the home state’s authorization and the
authority to enforce judgments against the host state provides foreign inves-
tors with much greater autonomy from home government action than in
other economic agreements.169
This Article focuses on the obligations and remedies in these treaties.
Whether one wants to view a bilateral investment treaty as an option con-
tract or as an obligation not to breach, the remedy remains the same: com-
pensation based on the harm to the investor.170 The structure of the
remedy—one of compensation, without any assessment or incorporation of
fault—indicates that the bilateral investment treaty system is a pricing
scheme. Governments buy the right to expropriate property so long as they
pay for the harm incurred by the foreign investor.171 Arbitration panels do
not have the authority to issue punitive damages or an alternative amount
that would deter expropriation.
While the structure of the remedy is informative, it is still important to
gauge the community reaction to the extent possible. Does the payment of
the remedy act as a fulfillment of the host country’s obligations or does the
act of expropriation lead to a reputational loss as a cooperative state? In this
case, it is helpful to distinguish between two audiences: other states—the
bilateral investment treaty partners or other states observing the invest-
ment—and private investors. These two audiences may have different per-
spectives on whether compensation buys compliance because they come
from structurally different positions. Governments are sometimes foreign in-
166. Been & Beauvais, supra note 162, at 116–28. R
167. See Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and
Remedy, 34 J. Legal Stud. 631, 633–34 (2005) [hereinafter Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement].
168. See id. at 635–36.
169. See id. at 643–44.
170. While the international arbitration panels that hear the cases and award damages are authorized
to award lost profits, the calculation of the harm rarely includes lost profits because the numbers are
considered too speculative. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/97/1, ¶¶ 121–22 (Aug. 30, 2000). In most cases, the award is based on the amount of the
actual investment rather than the expected gain from the project.
171. Domestic investors only have recourse to local law.
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vestors (that is, through sovereign wealth funds), but they are always in a
position of possibly needing to control the property within their state. In-
vestors may sometimes benefit from expropriations by the state (either indi-
rectly through infrastructure projects or directly by use of government
power to acquire property for their project), but they always bear some risk
of expropriation from the government. As such, governments may be more
receptive to compensation purchasing the right to expropriate than investors
are.
The home governments of investors have been notably quiet on issues of
investment disputes. So long as the host government complies with the
terms of the treaty and arbitrates disputes with complaining investors, home
states seem satisfied with the actions of the host state. While silence itself is
hard to interpret, the structure of the bilateral investment treaty system
provides some context for viewing silence as approval. Before the entry of
bilateral investment treaties and standing for private investors, home gov-
ernments frequently were dragged into disputes between their nationals and
host states. These disputes frequently led to extended diplomatic tensions
between the home state and the host state and occasionally to the threat of
force (that is, gun-boat diplomacy).172 Bilateral investment treaties provided
both home states and host states a means out of extended diplomatic dis-
putes. Part of the political function of bilateral investment treaties is to
“depoliticize” investment disputes.173 Home states can extricate themselves
from investment disputes and carry on friendly diplomatic relations with
foreign states without getting mired in the economic claims of their nation-
als. As Jeswald Salacuse argues, a bilateral investment treaty “allows [home
governments] to say to their nationals and companies aggrieved by host gov-
ernment acts that ‘you have your own remedy in the treaty. Use it if you
wish. Go away and don’t bother us.’ ” 174 Host states are under an obligation
to compensate foreign investors, but arbitration panels determine the extent
of compensation due, rather than the investors’ home state.
Because home states and host states created bilateral investment treaties
in part to keep investment disputes from being inter-state disputes, silence
by home governments can be reasonably interpreted as a sign of satisfaction
with the regime. Host governments remain treaty partners in good stead so
long as they comply with the treaty’s arbitration provisions and remedy re-
gime. To the extent that governments have been vocal about an investment
regime, it has been to advocate for less liability for host countries, not more.
After an arbitration involving the North American Free Trade Agreement’s
(“NAFTA”) investment chapter, the United States, Canadian, and Mexican
172. See Michael Tomz, Reputation and the Effect of International Law on Preferences and Beliefs 28
(Feb. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/Tomz-Intl-
Law-2008-02-11a.pdf [hereinafter Tomz, Preferences and Beliefs].
173. Salacuse, supra note 154, at 463. R
174. Id.
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governments issued a joint memorandum stating that the investment chap-
ter should be narrowly interpreted by arbitration panels.175 The memoran-
dum was a result of the arbitration panel’s decision that part of the host’s
state obligation to foreign investors included making all of its regulations
(national, state, and local) transparent to the investor.176 The governments’
memorandum expressed their disagreement with the arbitration panel and
their joint view that transparency was not part of the minimum standard of
treatment for foreign investment that the investment chapter required.177
By contrast, the audience of private investors is less likely to have an
option-contract view of bilateral investment treaties. If investors are equally
happy with compliance with the investment agreement and compliance
with the remedy regime, then there should be no decrease in foreign invest-
ment in a particular host state after a public investment dispute. Recent
empirical studies demonstrate that host states do experience a decrease in
foreign investment after a complaining investor has brought an arbitration
claim against the host country.178 This indicates that investors are not neu-
tral regarding compliance or the payment of compensation. Yet for the pur-
poses of determining the reputational impact on the host state of complying
with the treaty’s remedy regime but not its substantive obligations, it is
important to distinguish between investors’ views of whether the state is a
good treaty partner and whether the state has a higher political risk than
previously believed. Investors’ greater reticence to invest in host states that
have recently been involved in investment litigation could be the result of
investors’ isolation of the state as part of an informal sanction for law-break-
ing or it could reflect the investors’ updated view of the level of risk in-
volved in foreign investment in that state or both.179 The current evidence
cannot distinguish between these possibilities.
Thus in this case, it is possible that different audiences view the relation-
ship between the treaty’s substantive obligations and the remedy regime in
different ways. To the extent that the host state is appealing to an investor
audience, compliance with the investment treaty’s remedy regime may not
be sufficient to prevent a loss of reputation. Yet, to the extent that the host
state is primarily interested in keeping a good reputation for cooperativeness
with other governments, compliance with the remedy regime may be
sufficient.
175. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation on Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31,
2001), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/
nafta-interpr.aspx?view=d.
176. Id.; see also Salacuse, supra note 162, at 455–56. R
177. Salacuse, supra note 154, at 455–56. R
178. Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Reputational Effects of Investment Treaty
Disputes on Foreign Direct Investment, 65 Int’l Org. 401, 401 (2011).
179. If the political risk of investing in a state rises, then all else being equal, we should expect the
level of investment to decrease as the expected gains of the investment are lower.
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IV. The Design of Remedy Regimes
Even if the drafters of a treaty do not actively consider the relationship
between the remedy regime and the audience’s perception of the mandatory
nature of the substantive rules, such a relationship can exist. Remedies influ-
ence the audience’s beliefs, and it is these beliefs that determine whether a
remedy is a price or a sanction. Low remedy regimes can thus lead to two
different situations in international negotiations. The first is an intentional
match between lower remedies and less mandatory first-order rules. This is
the situation in which the treaty members prefer compliance with the agree-
ment’s substantive rules but also wish to permit breach under certain cir-
cumstances. In such cases, the remedy regime can facilitate the breach in a
manner the negotiating parties intended by displacing reputational costs.
The second is a mismatch between the intention of the treaty drafters and
the beliefs of the audience. The negotiating parties may desire that the sub-
stantive terms of the treaty be fully binding but: (1) they have access to few
remedies; or (2) they begin with low remedies with the aspiration of increas-
ing the severity of the remedies in the future. In such a case, the remedies
may influence the beliefs of the audience in a counter-productive manner.
There is a risk that the remedy will create a set of beliefs concerning accept-
able state behavior that is contrary to the intention of the negotiators. The
remedy will not be the only factor that influences the audience’s beliefs, but
it can be an important factor.
In this section, I focus on the possibility that negotiators purposefully select
a remedy regime that emphasizes compliance with second-order rules. I ad-
dress the possibility of a mismatch between remedy regimes and the negoti-
ators’ intentions in Part V.
A. Costly Signals: Complying (or Not) with Remedies
The existence of dispute resolution systems and explicit remedy rules can
redefine cooperativeness, from compliance with the treaty’s substantive rules
to compliance with the secondary rules of the treaty. The “cooperativeness”
in this latter type of compliance—that is, compliance with second-order
rules—is somewhat unique to international law. In domestic law, compli-
ance with second-order rules may not be seen as particularly cooperative.
Paying a judgment or otherwise abiding by a court order is not voluntary in
domestic law. While the state may not enforce compliance with the con-
tract, state power is available to enforce compliance with any court-ordered
remedies.
The same is not true in international law. The international system fa-
mously lacks a centralized enforcement system, and thus compliance with
second-order rules (much like compliance with first-order rules) is volun-
tary. The state could choose to break both first-order and second-order treaty
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rules. This is not to discount the possibility that peer pressure, accultura-
tion, or reciprocity (or even coercion where there is a large power disparity
between states) could and do sustain compliance with international law.
These effects can be substantial, but the lack of a centralized government
with a monopoly on the use of force is a core feature of international rela-
tions that affects the dynamics of the international system. The default is a
lack of enforcement, rather than state-backed enforcement.180 Particularly
when dealing with more powerful states, the adherence to judgments or
other international remedies is essentially voluntary. As a consequence, the
decision of a state to comply with an international order is at least partially
cooperative. It is an action that keeps the state within the framework of the
international agreement. Compliance with second-order rules does not nec-
essarily eliminate any stain from the breach of the first-order rule, but it
does lessen the reputational loss (relative to a system without such an insti-
tution) because it provides an opportunity for the state to remain in compli-
ance with the broader treaty regime.
The enforcement institution itself can determine what qualifies as com-
pliance with a regime. In their highly influential discussion of the medieval
law merchant, Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast provide
a model where reputational institutions (the law merchant) are sufficient to
sustain international trade when no local or national-level government en-
forcement of contracts is possible.181 Their model addresses the problem of a
medieval merchant. The merchant could sue another merchant who had al-
legedly cheated him wherever the transaction took place, but the ensuing
judgment was often hard to enforce because the respondent merchant could
be many jurisdictions away. Milgrom, North, and Weingast model an infor-
mational solution: the institution of the law merchant (or other reputational
network) that could maintain a cooperative equilibrium even where state
enforcement of contract was lacking.182 As the authors describe it, the law
180. States could make an ex ante payment into a fund, yet this is also voluntary, just at an earlier
point—before the hearing, rather than after—and only up to the amount contributed to the fund. In the
U.S.-Iranian Claims cases, the United States had seized Iranian assets and thus “volunteered” Iranian
contributions to the fund. This is not the normal case, nor would most international lawyers want the
United States’ unilateral decision to seize foreign assets to be the primary means of providing remedies
for breach of contract.
181. Milgrom, North & Weingast, supra note 1, at 4. R
182. The narrative that Milgrom, North, and Weingast relate is historically dubious, but remains
highly influential with political scientists and international law scholars. Historians question whether
reputational networks, rather than state actors, were primarily responsible for enforcing merchant con-
tracts. See Emily Kadens, Order Within Law, Variety Within Custom: The Character of the Medieval Merchant
Law, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 39, 51–52 (2004); Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern
Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant’, 21 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 685, 698–712 (2006) (arguing that
local authorities enforced contracts). Stephen Sachs additionally argues that Milgrom, North, and Wein-
gast fundamentally misperceive the medieval institution in the sense that there was never an individual
who was a law merchant. Sachs maintains that there was, at best, a general threat of exclusion from the
merchant guilds. Sachs, supra, at 695, 699 n.34, 706–12. The term “law merchant” also has a second
meaning, which is separate from contract enforcement. Law merchant or lex mercatoria can also mean a
uniform set of commercial law established by merchants and enforced by merchants participating in
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merchant would keep a record of all merchants who had failed to pay out-
standing judgments against them. Merchants who were considering a new
contracting partner could pay a fee to the law merchant to discover whether
the prospective partner had any outstanding judgments, and thereby avoid
“cheating” merchants. In Milgrom, North, and Weingast’s model, the in-
stitution of the law merchant disseminates information regarding the nature
of the prospective contracting parties, but only information on second-order
violations.183
The enforcement institution shaped the audience’s beliefs about what co-
operative behavior entailed. By selecting “outstanding judgment” as the
relevant criterion for judging cooperativeness, the institution of the law
merchant implicitly determined that all merchants who abide by second-
order rules are good contracting partners. The process of defining coopera-
tive behavior emphasized one form of compliance, namely compensation of
the breached-upon party, and de-emphasized other forms of compliance,
such as adherence to the terms of the contract.184 Here, the system of dispute
resolution effectively launders substantive law breaches for reputational pur-
poses and puts all of the emphasis on paying the judgment. Only merchants
who breached the contract (cheating) and violated second-order rules (not
compensating) were labeled as “uncooperative.” Dispute resolution can,
thus, “normalize” violations of the regime’s substantive rules by providing a
international trade. See Charles Donahue Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex mercatoria: An Attempt at the
Probatio Diabolica, 5 Chi. J. Int’l L. 21 (2004) (discussing this definition and contesting its historical
reality). The law merchant idea also remains popular in commercial law scholarship for the idea that
businesses may be able to govern themselves separate from state actors. See Robert Cooter, Decentralized
Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1643, 1646–50 (1996) (acknowledging the historically questionable foundations of the medieval
law merchant but highlighting the importance of the analysis to current economic activity). Modern
historians generally do not believe that a uniform system of merchant law existed in the medieval period.
Donahue, supra, at 21–26 (challenging whether there was a specific merchant law in the medieval period
rather than local law with certain procedural accommodations to merchants); Kadens, supra, at 42–47
(arguing that enforcement was primarily a state function and that there was no uniform independent
merchant law at trading fairs); Sachs, supra, at 687–794 (arguing that merchants may have had special
status at trading fairs but that merchants’ contracts were governed by local law).
183. In medieval trade, there was a substantive rule to abide by the terms of a contract. Any breach of
the terms of the contract was in contravention of contract law—“cheating” in Milgrom, North, and
Weingast’s terms. Notably, the law merchant did not produce a list of all the merchants who had
judgments registered against them for breach of contract, that is, all cheating types. Rather, the law
merchant only reported on merchants who had failed to pay an outstanding judgment. If the merchant
abided by second-order rules, making the required payment of the judgment, then the merchant was
labeled as “cooperative,” even if the merchant had cheated on the contract.
184. While Milgrom, North, and Weingast highlight how information dissemination deters cheat-
ing, their example does not necessarily support this conclusion. Rather, their narrative supports a conclu-
sion that second-order violations (the failure to pay a judgment for cheating) could be deterred. This is a
different type of cooperation, one premised on an obligation to compensate rather than an obligation to
abide by the terms of the contract. This difference matters to analyses of reputation and legal institutions.
Milgrom, North, and Weingast argue that the merchant’s reputation for honesty is what supported the
international trade system. Yet the narrative they tell leads to a slightly different conclusion with regard
to reputation. The important metric for reputation is not the compliance with a contract’s substantive
rules, or cheating, but compliance with the legal regime’s judgments.
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framework whereby states can deviate from the treaty’s substantive provi-
sions but then adhere to the treaty’s remedy regime. So long as the state
does not violate the regime’s framework rules and consistently submits to
the jurisdiction of the dispute resolution institution and accepts its judg-
ments, the breaching state can demonstrate that it continues to be
cooperative.
This does not mean that the state may not suffer any reputational loss for
the breach even if it complies with the remedy regime. Rather, the claim is
relative: the reputational loss the state will suffer is less than it would be
without a dispute resolution system. The assignment of a remedy permits
the state to demonstrate its adherence to the treaty’s framework. Just as a
dispute settlement can prevent injured states from over-retaliating and in-
juring the cooperative equilibrium of the agreement,185 dispute settlement
systems can allow breaching states to demonstrate their continued coopera-
tiveness with the treaty’s second-order rules. Dispute resolution can thus be
a mechanism of escape as well as enforcement, managing departures from
the regime’s substantive obligations yet keeping states within the coopera-
tive framework of the agreement.
The WTO system allows states to demonstrate that they are still coopera-
tive with the overall treaty regime by complying with the dispute settle-
ment system. This includes submitting to the jurisdiction of the treaty
regime and accepting the remedies that it assigns. The decision to remain
within the regime and accept an international court’s jurisdiction should not
be taken for granted. Domestic legislators can make political hay out of
rejecting the authority of an international body to evaluate the consistency
of national policies with treaty obligations. The decision to abide by the
dispute resolution system is even more costly if it requires the state to accept
a loss of trade concessions. The willingness of governments to do so allows
them to show through costly actions that they remain committed to the
treaty’s goals and cooperation with other member states.
While many states have breached the WTO’s substantive provisions,
WTO member states’ remarkable compliance with the WTO’s dispute reso-
lution system might be the trade regime’s most significant, if underap-
preciated, achievement.186 Even when states expect that they will lose a case,
WTO members have accepted the system’s jurisdiction.187 When com-
plaining states have lost cases, they have not imposed sanctions on the al-
leged breaching state despite the ruling. Similarly, when complaining states
receive WTO authorization to retaliate, breaching states have not threatened
185. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2, at 431; Thompson, supra note 38, at 309. R
186. See generally Davey, supra note 131 (noting high compliance as part of the WTO’s implementa- R
tion success).
187. Cf. Davey, supra note 131 (discussing the outcome of disputes, most of which found violations). R
Given the scope of Davey’s inquiry, if a state refused to respect the jurisdiction of the court, this would
likely be included in his discussion.
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counter-retaliation. This compliance with second-order rules has been very
high, even for politically sensitive issues, such as subsidies for agriculture
and civil aircraft.188 Like Milgrom, North, and Weingast’s narrative of the
law merchant, this continued acceptance of the jurisdiction and judgments
of the WTO dispute resolution system may become the touchstone for judg-
ing state cooperativeness.
The general approach of developed states to bilateral investment treaties
has been to consider treaty partners to be in good standing so long as the
damages for any expropriation are paid. Serious pressure is brought to bear
only when a treaty partner violates the treaty, either by refusing to go to
arbitration or by refusing to pay the arbitral award. For instance, the United
States has taken action against Argentina (including voting against addi-
tional loans to Argentina in multilateral lending agencies and denial of trade
benefits) when Argentina refused to pay arbitral awards in favor of American
investor claims.189
This view of remedies—as providing opportunities for the international
regime to permit deviations as well as for states to demonstrate their contin-
ued participation in the regime—is radically different from other views of
remedies that focus on the exclusion of states from cooperative regimes for
acts of noncompliance. For instance, Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro have
recently argued that international remedies are a form of “outcasting.”190
The primary focus of Hathaway and Shapiro’s article is whether interna-
tional law can legitimately be considered “law,” as it is not enforced
through a centralized institution with the threat of overwhelming coercive
force.191 They argue that international law is law because it is enforced by
the threat of ostracism.192 Drawing on analogies to the legal system in medi-
eval Iceland, with its system of exile, and to canon law, with its system of
excommunication, Hathaway and Shapiro maintain that international law
remedies effectively cast states out of the benefits of cooperation and thereby
establish a non-violent but effective system of enforcement.193
In a purely instrumental sense, Hathaway and Shapiro are certainly cor-
rect that denying states benefits can provide them with an incentive to alter
their policies. Yet in a social sense, their focus on outcasting and excommu-
nication leans heavily on the idea of community opprobrium. As the authors
note, this concept is intimately related to concepts of “shaming” and public
188. See generally id.
189. Doug Palmer, Obama Says to Suspend Trade Benefits for Argentina, Reuters, Mar. 26, 2012, availa-
ble at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/us-usa-argentina-trade-idUSBRE82P0QX20120326.
190. See generally Oona A. Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and Interna-
tional Law, 121 Yale L.J. 252 (2011).
191. Id. at 255–57.
192. Id. at 258.
193. Id. at 282–308 (arguing that outcasting is the dominant form of enforcement in international
law).
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denunciation.194 Their discussion of remedies is reflective of a broader theme
in international law that views remedies as a means of punishing defections
and enforcing rules.195 Yet remedies do not have to have a social meaning
that connotes shame or punishment. Rather than being cast out of an inter-
national regime, explicit remedy rules provide a means for states to deviate
from substantive rules but remain within the treaty’s collaborative frame-
work. Remedies can exact a cost from states that adopt certain policies, but
this cost can be viewed as a mutually accepted expense for staying within
the community. Moreover, compliance with the remedy is itself an act of
cooperation with the treaty regime. Instead of being excluded from future
collaboration, remedies can provide an occasion for the state to express its
on-going interest in supporting the regime. This dual nature of remedies—
the cost but also the reintegration—is neglected within the outcasting and
shaming view. By downplaying the restorative aspect of remedies, this con-
ventional view overlooks how remedies can make deviations easier for the
state to bear, promoting looser but more robust forms of cooperation.
B. Designing Dispute Resolution to Displace Reputational Sanctions
This analysis highlights how governments may create formal dispute res-
olution systems to lower the costs of deviation rather than to raise them.
Remedy regimes can provide states, purposefully or not, with an alternative
to compliance at a certain price. International law scholars generally accept
that formal dispute resolution systems will increase the level of compliance
with international rules. Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal argue that a
system of independent international tribunals can increase states’ compliance
with international law, relying in part on governments’ concern for their
reputations to support their argument.196 In a related vein, Andrew Guzman
argues that states will often refuse to create third-party dispute settlement
mechanisms because these mechanisms impose reputational costs on the los-
ing state without creating significant benefits for the successful state.197
These scholars are not necessarily mistaken, but in some cases a different
causal relationship may exist. By embedding conflict resolution within a
broader cooperative arrangement, formal dispute resolution institutions may
legitimize deviations from a treaty’s substantive rules and lower the reputa-
tional costs of breach. Thus, negotiators may create a system of third-party
tribunals to hear disputes as a means of facilitating breach, thereby adding
flexibility to a regime. This account also fits with political scientists’ view of
194. Id. at 308–10.
195. See, e.g., George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About
Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379 (1996).
196. See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 2; see also Helfer & Slaughter, Supranational Adjudication, R
supra note 8, at 276; Helfer & Slaughter, International Tribunals, supra note 2. R
197. See generally Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note 4. R
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dispute resolution as a means of decreasing the rigidity of legal obligations
and managing conflict within a cooperative framework.198
1. Flexibility and Cooperation
Discussions of institutional design in the political science literature em-
phasize the role of flexibility mechanisms in structuring international coop-
eration.199 Flexibility in the structure of the substance or the process of the
institutions permits treaty designers to modulate the terms of the interna-
tional agreement in a manner that can maximize the joint gains of coopera-
tion to all of the parties.200 The need for flexibility comes from a number of
sources including heterogeneity in the preferences of parties and from uncer-
tainty regarding the domestic effects of the legal agreements, the actions of
partner states, or the likelihood of future economic or political shocks. By
modulating the obligations of the international agreement, more parties
may join the agreement and may be able to comply with the terms of the
agreement under a greater variety of economic and political conditions.201
An example of an inflexible (or perfectly rigid) agreement is an agreement
that has substantive obligations that do not permit derogation under any
future state of the world. The agreement would not permit any reservations
and would not have an exit clause. In addition, the negotiating states would
not include any procedural voting rules or other governance mechanisms
whereby substantive obligations could be modulated or withdrawn in the
future. States could presumably join the agreement at a later point in time,
but once committed, the state could not diminish its obligations. In reality,
no international agreement would actually meet these conditions. All agree-
ments are renegotiable if all of the parties wish to release one another from
their obligations or revise the agreement; however, agreements can be de-
signed to make renegotiation easier or harder. This is true either at the level
of the existence of the entire agreement or of specific obligations within the
agreement’s framework.202
198. See, e.g., B. Peter Rosendorff, Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO’s Dispute Resolu-
tion Procedure, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 389 (2005) [hereinafter Rosendorff, Stability and Rigidity]; Leslie
Johns, Depth Versus Rigidity in the Design of International Trade Agreements (Sept. 3, 2012) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ljohns/DvR_120903.pdf.
199. See, e.g., Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 Int’l Org. 761 (2001). While international law scholars are less likely to use the term
“flexibility,” they are familiar with the legal mechanisms by which flexibility is achieved.
200. See generally Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Ties that Bind: A Learning Model of Agreement Flexi-
bility, 55 Int’l Org. 289 (2001).
201. See Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard,” supra note 12; Rosendorff & Milner, supra note 12; R
Rosendorff, Stability and Rigidity, supra note 198; Johns, supra note 198. R
202. See Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, supra note 199, at 773. Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal distin- R
guish between two types of flexibility: adaptive and transformative. Adaptive flexibility mechanisms
allow states to make deviations from specific commitments, such as escaping from some tariff bindings
for a period of economic hardship. Transformative flexibility mechanisms are governance rules that allow
the parties to alter the substantive rules that bind the member states, such as voting rules to modify
treaty obligations.
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Rather than having a rigid agreement, parties may wish to introduce de-
sign mechanisms that provide greater options for states to modulate their
legal obligations, either presently or in the future.203 Exit clauses permit a
state to renounce an agreement and end the state’s legal obligations under
the treaty.204 Escape clauses permit members of the agreement to deviate
from an agreement’s substantive provisions under certain conditions, such as
exceptional economic duress or political upheaval.205 Agreements can also
include governance measures that permit the parties to amend their rules
after the treaty negotiations have concluded or to delegate rule-making to
internal committees or other international institutions.206
Like other forms of institutional design, dispute resolution systems can
also be a flexibility mechanism. Similar to escape clauses that specify ex ante
when states can deviate from their obligations, dispute resolution procedures
can specify ex ante what disputes the system will have jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate and what the remedies for breach will be. In both systems, the treaty
negotiators may prefer adherence to the rules detailed in the treaty but es-
tablish a set of conditions under which the parties may deviate from these
obligations. With escape clauses, the treaty negotiators specify political or
economic conditions under which the parties may deviate from the treaty’s
rules. With dispute resolution systems, the treaty negotiators can explicitly
provide for certain remedies in the case of breach. Political scientists have
explicitly modeled dispute resolution systems as a means of anticipating and
managing future defections from the agreement. Peter Rosendorff discusses
how the WTO’s dispute resolution system works as a flexibility mechanism
203. See generally Laurence Helfer, Flexibility in International Agreements, in International Law and
International Relations Theory: Taking Stock (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2012).
204. See generally Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 83. States may still have international R
legal obligations under customary international law if the treaty was meant to codify international cus-
tomary law or has subsequently been accepted as customary international law. See id. For a discussion of
whether states should be allowed to exit unilaterally from customary law, see generally Curtis A. Bradley
& G. Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 Yale L.J. 202 (2010).
205. For instance, trade agreements often include safeguard measures, which allow states to raise
tariffs on imports to protect vulnerable domestic industries if there has been a dramatic increase in
imports, and this rise threatens to cause material injury to a domestic industry. See generally Sykes, Protec-
tionism as a “Safeguard”, supra note 12; Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 12; Rosendorff & Milner, supra note R
12. For a discussion of how escape clauses are used and adjudicated in practice, see Pelc, supra note 128. R
Some human rights agreements permit their members to derogate from some rights in times of national
emergency. See Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies: A Critique of
Implementation by the European Commission and Court of Human Right and the Human Rights Committee in the
United Nations, 22 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1, 8 (1981); Robert E. Norris & Paula Desio Reiton, The Suspension of
Guarantees: A Comparative Analysis of the American Convention on Human Rights and the Constitutions of the
States Parties, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 189 (1980).
206. See Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, supra note 199, at 773. For a discussion of how international R
agreements can delegate rulemaking, see Curtis A. Bradley & Judith Kelley, The Concept of International
Delegation, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2008); Tom Ginsberg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions,
Commitment, and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 707, 734 (2006); Tom Ginsberg,
International Delegation and State Disaggregation, 20 Const. Pol. Econ. 323 (2009). Even sovereign debt
contracts can include terms that allow the state’s creditors to jointly amend the terms of the debt con-
tract. See Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Political Risk and Sovereign Debt Contracts
(John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 583 (2d Series), 2011).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLI\54-2\HLI204.txt unknown Seq: 47 11-JUL-13 11:44
2013 / Pricing Compliance 305
that reduces the fragility of the cooperative equilibrium in the trade agree-
ment.207 As he argues, the dispute resolution system “enhances the stability
of the cooperative regime; it does so not because it has become more rigid,
but because it has become more flexible.” 208 Similarly, Leslie Johns models
dispute resolution systems in global and regional trade agreements as mech-
anisms that permit greater deviations from trade rules while supporting co-
operative trade policies.209
Interestingly, neither the political science literature nor the international
law literature has integrated the recent work on flexibility with the broader
literature on cooperation and its emphasis on the role of informal enforce-
ment mechanisms, such as reputation. This is notable because discussions of
flexibility have important implications on how governments and other non-
state actors understand states’ actions within a regime. Historically, political
scientists have placed great weight on the ability of reputation to maintain
cooperative agreements in an international system that lacks a centralized
enforcement system.210 Yet the flexibility approach to institutions creates
confusion and noise in defining cooperative behavior and can potentially
undermine the informal system supporting cooperation.
Flexibility mechanisms pose a challenge to conventional international re-
lations theory because the reputational analysis is based on the idea of com-
pliance with a set of legal obligations within a treaty agreement. To the
extent that legal obligations are clear and escape options are limited, a repu-
tation for cooperativeness is relatively easy to determine.211 Either the state
complies with its treaty obligations, in which case it has a good reputation
as a cooperative treaty partner, or it does not, and its reputation suffers.
Where the agreement itself provides a greater range of options, the possible
interpretations of the state’s actions as cooperative or noncooperative become
more nuanced. Flexibility mechanisms create a grey area, where actions may
be formally legal but are not necessarily supportive of the goals of the re-
gime. As a result, the reputational impact of using flexibility provisions is
far from clear and the flexibility literature does not discuss the possible
reputational impact of these provisions.
Consider, for instance, a state’s decision to exit a treaty regime. So long as
the state has complied with all of the treaty’s requirements for exiting the
agreement, the state’s action is not a breach of the agreement.212 The state
has acted consistently with the bargained-for terms of the agreement. None-
theless, other treaty members may not view the state’s exit as particularly
cooperative. By leaving the regime, the state is withdrawing from an activ-
207. Rosendorff, Stability and Rigidity, supra note 198, at 392–96. R
208. Id. at 389.
209. Johns, supra note 198. R
210. See sources cited supra note 1. R
211. See generally Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1. R
212. See, e.g., Helfer, Exiting Treaties, supra note 83; Timothy L. Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegoti- R
ation in International Law, 51 Harv. Int’l L.J. 379 (2010).
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ity and decreasing the global effectiveness of the agreement. Such formally
legal but unsupportive actions do not fit easily into the international rela-
tions theory framework of cooperation and reputation. The model of cooper-
ation is based on a prisoner’s dilemma game (or a similar game-theoretic
model) where the parties have a choice between cooperation and defection.213
Creating a third option where states can eschew the policy outcomes the
treaty seeks to advance yet avoid violating the terms of the agreement com-
plicates the narrative of what cooperative activity entails.214
This complication is important for international relations theory. If states
comply with international agreements because they want to maintain a good
reputation as treaty partners, then what does the use of flexibility mecha-
nisms mean for the international system’s ability to support cooperation?
Fundamentally, the way in which the reputation mechanism would work
depends on the audience’s beliefs about the significance of using flexibility
mechanisms.215 Although the flexibility literature does not discuss this is-
sue, there are multiple ways in which the international audience could un-
derstand a state’s decision to use such provisions. One possibility is that the
audience may view the use of escape clauses, reservations, or exit provisions
as a negative signal of cooperativeness.216 Even though the state is acting
within the legal confines of the agreement, making use of flexibility mecha-
nisms runs counter to the goals of the regime. The state is not in violation of
the treaty agreement, but it is failing to adhere to the preferred course of
action that the treaty sets out, opting instead for an allowable, but less pre-
ferred course. In this framing, the reputation of the state as cooperative
should suffer.
Alternatively, the audience could view the use of flexibility mechanisms
as completely permissible because they are part of the political bargain.217
The state has made a contract with other states and is sticking to the terms
negotiated. That the use of escape clauses may be a less preferred means of
complying with the treaty’s requirements is of little moment; the state is
only making use of the policy options that the treaty makes available. In this
framing, a state’s decision to make use of an escape clause, reservation, or
exit option should have no reputational impact. So long as the state’s actions
conform to the requirements of the treaty, the state’s actions do not send a
negative signal, and the state maintains (or even improves) its reputation for
cooperativeness.
213. See generally Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1. R
214. For an effort to incorporate exit into a prisoner’s dilemma type game, see Helfer, Exiting Treaties,
supra note 83. R
215. For a discussion of how the international system is a social construction, see Alexander Wendt,
Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics, 46 Int’l Org. 391 (1992).
216. For the view that reservations will hurt the state’s reputation for cooperativeness, see generally
Helfer, Reservations, supra note 1. R
217. Swaine argues that a state’s insistence on a reservation may be a positive signal of its cooperative-
ness in a treaty regime, but the reservation signals that the state will only agree to those provisions that it
has the political will to implement. See Swaine, supra note 25. R
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Neither view is obviously correct—both views are viable social construc-
tions—but the two understandings have very different implications for co-
operation theory. If the audience views the use of the flexibility mechanisms
as detrimental to cooperation (and thereby downgrades the state’s reputation
for cooperativeness), then this has a significant impact on international rela-
tions theory. The ability of reputational concerns to uphold agreements is
diminished. If states can suffer reputational losses by using flexibility mech-
anisms, then reputational concerns do not support the actual texts of agree-
ments, but a stricter view of appropriate policy action that is consistent with
the treaty’s aims and goals. This may undermine the agreement in the nego-
tiation phase and the enforcement phase. In a situation where states believe
that they cannot take advantage of flexibility mechanisms without suffering
a reputational loss, then more states may be reluctant to join the treaty
agreement if they do not anticipate that they will be able to comply with
the goals of the agreement. For instance, a state may be less likely to join an
investment agreement if it believes it will suffer a reputational loss if it
makes use of an escape clause during an economic shock. While the treaty’s
escape clause formally gives the state the space to enact such a policy, it will
not necessarily be viewed as a cooperative action, and thus the reputation of
the state may nonetheless suffer.
At the enforcement end, a state may be more willing to violate an agree-
ment if it is going to suffer a reputational loss for using a flexibility mecha-
nism. For instance, if a state experiences a political or economic shock, it
will have a choice between making use of a treaty’s escape clause (if it exists)
and simply violating the agreement. Should the state expect to suffer a
reputational loss regardless of its choice—using the flexibility provision or
violating the agreement—then the option to violate may be more attractive
because the state will possess more policy discretion in the latter course.
Even if there is a greater reputational loss for violations as compared to the
use of the flexibility mechanism, the relevant analysis for the state will be
the costs of violation versus the benefits of making use of the escape clause.
At the margin, the fact that the escape clause entails reputational costs low-
ers the relative costs of violation as compared to a set of beliefs where the use
of an escape clause is without reputational loss.
By contrast, if states can utilize flexibility provisions without suffering a
reputational loss, then there is a different tradeoff. Governments may be
more willing to sign onto treaty agreements, but they will have more discre-
tion in their national policy choices. The overall effectiveness of the regime
may be reduced—that is, the number of states that implement the preferred
policies may be lower—but the treaty may have a greater influence over
more states because more states will join the agreement and abide by the,
albeit looser, bindings of the treaty.
This analysis does not attempt to resolve definitively what the social
meaning of flexibility mechanisms will be. Rather, the goal here is to high-
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light the links between the flexibility literature and cooperation theory that
have thus far been generally neglected in both international relations and
international law scholarship. But the discussions in this Article provide
important insights into how the audience is likely to view flexibility mecha-
nisms. Most importantly, the structure of the flexibility mechanism is likely
to matter. If the consequences of using a flexibility mechanism are static,
then the mechanism is more likely to be viewed as a price than as a sanction.
The pricing approach indicates that there is not a reputational effect from
using the flexibility mechanism—the ability to make use of the provision
has been purchased. In contrast, the sanctioning approach indicates that
there will be reputational sanctions in addition to the costs of using the
flexibility provision.
2. Reconceptualizing Pacta Sunt Servanda
The flip side of institutional flexibility is the strict rule of international
law that treaties are to be obeyed. This paper attempts to reconceptualize
what pacta sunt servanda may mean for certain treaty regimes. The focus here
is not entirely on obedience to a treaty’s substantive rules, but on the treaty’s
framework as well, including its dispute resolution provisions and remedy
regime.
First, this Article emphasizes that the parties to a treaty may have strong
policy reasons for preferring compliance with second-order rules rather than
first-order rules, particularly in economic issue areas. As political scientists
have discussed, the parties may prefer a regime that is robust—capable of
encouraging deep cooperation that will survive political and economic
shocks—rather than one that has high levels of compliance but is fragile.
For instance, the WTO is fundamentally a managed trade organization, in
which parties bargain over trade concessions.218 The resulting treaties are the
negotiated balance of trade concessions, in which parties grant access to their
national markets in return for access to others’ markets. For the trade sys-
tem’s purposes, it is beneficial for the negotiating parties to stretch—that is,
to agree to a greater range of concessions than they might be able to keep in
future political or economic conditions. Because the future is uncertain, the
governments do not know which of these concessions will be problematic
and which will be achievable. Governments may be unwilling to agree to
deep cooperation if they anticipate that their feet will be held to the fire
with regards to all obligations.219
218. As international trade economists frequently note, free trade theory posits that states will do
better by liberalizing their individual markets, even if other states do not. See generally Paul Krugman,
What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? 35 J. Econ. Literature 113 (1997). Instead of promot-
ing unilateral liberalization, the GATT-WTO system effectively treats states’ market barriers as bargain-
ing chips, an asset that should be given away only for something of equivalent value. This bargaining
system has led to incrementally greater global market liberalization but does so through merchantalist
means.
219. Palmeter & Alexandrov, supra note 117, at 664–65. R
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By building a dispute resolution system into the agreement that can price
noncompliance with substantive terms, the remedy regime can promote
deeper cooperation ex ante by encouraging compliance, but allowing states
the possibility to buy themselves out of the concessions that later become
overly onerous. As Kenneth Dam noted decades ago with regard to the
GATT system, “because of the economic nature of tariff concessions and the
domestic political sensitivity inherently involved in trade issues, a system
that made withdrawals of concessions impossible would tend to discourage
the making of concessions in the first place. It is better, for example, that
100 commitments should be made and that ten should be withdrawn than
that only fifty commitments should be made and that all of them should be
kept.”220
The traditional interpretation of pacta sunt servanda—requiring states to
comply with all of the concessions it offers even if a dispute resolution sys-
tem is part of the treaty regime—could be detrimental to the goals of the
trade system by discouraging states from stretching to achieve deeper coop-
eration. Along a similar line, the states creating the treaty regime may be
attempting to recruit more states into the regime. The more severe the com-
pliance rules, the higher the potential reputational costs of joining the re-
gime. In short, there is a tradeoff between the depth of cooperation, the
breadth of state involvement, and the strictness of our interpretation of the
pacta sunt servanda requirement. A rigid understanding of the pacta sunt ser-
vanda requirement, demanding compliance with all substantive provisions
all of the time, comes at a cost to international law. It may prevent states
from engaging in more extensive cooperation by limiting the concessions
states are willing to make and the regimes they are willing to join.
Second, this Article highlights how the parties (the negotiating states)
select not only the treaty’s substantive terms, but also its dispute resolution
system and remedy rules. Members of a treaty regime can select any reme-
dial regime that they like. This is different from private parties bargaining
under American contract law, where the parties take much of the contract
regime—particularly the rule formally forbidding punitive damages for
breach—as exogenous.221 Instead, the lack of a sovereign set of rules regard-
ing treaties in the international system allows the parties to draft any reme-
dial provisions that they prefer. If the parties wish to create a system in
which substantive obligations can be breached for a price, then the treaty
can be created to do so. The entire treaty regime, not just the substantive
provisions, will be a reflection of the parties’ preferences. Thus, for some
treaty regimes, the principle of pacta sunt servanda can be understood as com-
plying with the treaty’s framework, not necessarily obeying its substantive
provisions, if the parties themselves have selected that structure.
220. Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization 80
(1970).
221. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. R
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V. The Matching (or Mismatching) Remedies and Obligations
Formal remedies may or may not be additive to informal sanctions, and
thus the creation of formal remedy regimes may increase or decrease the
overall level of costs from noncompliance.222 The idea that formal remedies
may potentially decrease the overall level of costs is contrary to the prevail-
ing account in international law that formal remedies build upon informal
sanctions.223 Yet recognizing the potential for an inverse relationship be-
tween formal remedies and reputational sanctions is important when design-
ing a remedy regime. Most remedy regimes are designed to establish a
certain level of compliance. The designers of a regime understand that mem-
ber governments may deviate from the regime’s substantive rules at some
point in the future, and negotiators may or may not wish to deter all of these
possible deviations. In establishing the regime’s remedy rules, negotiators
can attempt to establish a level of penalty that approximates the negotiating
parties’ view of when deviations should be permitted. Understanding
whether the formal sanctions will work to supplement informal sanctions or
will instead undermine informal sanctions is important to questions of rem-
edy design.
Explicitly discussing the relationship between remedies and the binding
nature of treaty obligations highlights the possibility that negotiators’ at-
tempts to harden international law may be counter-productive. When the
negotiators do not actively consider the role of reputation in their remedial
scheme—effectively discounting the possibility of a pricing effect—negotia-
tors may set remedies at a sub-optimally low level. In many situations,
negotiators may be better off avoiding a remedy regime altogether than
compromising on a regime that provides some limited remedies, which are
insufficient to deter breach.
222. There is a methodological point here as well. This Article attempts to highlight how reputa-
tional concerns regarding breaches of international law are not independent of the broader regime in
which the breach occurs. Simply stating that there has been a breach of international law does not
provide enough context to enable observers to determine what the reputational consequences will be.
This is relevant to a growing empirical examination of situations in which elected officials or citizens will
support greater compliance with international law, in part due to reputational concerns. See, e.g., Michael
Tomz, Interests, Information, and the Domestic Politics of International Agreements (July 2004) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://www.stanford.edu/~tomz/working/Tomz2004a.pdf; Tomz,
Preferences and Beliefs, supra note 172. This empirical work is a notable and valuable addition to theoret- R
ical studies of reputation in international relations and international law. This Article underscores the
importance of institutional context for the research design of these empirical projects. For instance,
empirical studies that ask government officials or citizens whether they support a governmental policy
that would contravene international law without discussing the broader institutional context may be
misleading. The respondent’s answer may be very different depending on whether or not the respondent
understands that the regime provides for compensation for breach or other rebalancing. Consequently,
divorcing the question of whether a respondent supports a governmental policy that would entail a
breach of international law from the institutional design of the regime establishing the international law
rules may bias the study by overestimating the respondent’s expectation of the reputational costs.
223. Guzman, How International Law Works, supra note 1, at 19; Tomz, Preferences and Be- R
liefs, supra note 172. But see Scott & Stephan, supra note 1, at 580. R
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The risk of a mismatch between the enforcement goals of the treaty and
the remedy regime is highest with international environmental agreements,
but it is also present with human rights agreements. Many environmental
agreements have already engaged a system of pricing as part of the substan-
tive rules of the system. For instance, the Kyoto Protocol allows states to
purchase emissions credits from other states in order to meet the treaty’s
substantive requirements of decreasing emissions.224 If a state does not take
sufficient measures to decrease its own emissions production to the specified
levels, then it can purchase the difference from other states that have excess
emissions reductions.225 Naturally, what constitutes excess emissions reduc-
tions depends on the baseline that the state is provided in the treaty. The
Kyoto Protocol intentionally provided some states, such as Russia and
Ukraine, with “headroom” with respect to their emissions limits, such that
they would be able to sell emissions credits to states with more restrictive
baselines, such as Germany or Canada.226 This decision to commodify emis-
sions has been widely criticized by environmental groups, who object to the
idea that states or firms can purchase the right to pollute. However, such
measures have been supported by economists, who emphasize that com-
modification can lower the economic cost of pollution reduction.227
In the 2001 Marrakesh Accords, the members of the Kyoto Protocol cre-
ated a set of second-order rules addressing compliance with the first-order
rules.228 The remedy regime also deals in quantifiable emissions levels: any
state that fails to meet its multi-year emissions targets has the shortfall,
times thirty percent, subtracted from its next multi-year emissions levels.229
Whether this system is a price or a sanction depends on the perception of
the audience. The nature of the issue area—providing a sustainable level of a
public good—indicates that the rules should be mandatory—a failure to
comply with the rules (particularly by a large number of states) could lead to
serious environmental damage on a global scale. The remedy regime and the
substantive rules, however, lean more towards a pricing system. The Kyoto
Protocol makes emissions reductions available for purchase. Rather than a
mandatory obligation to adopt the type of government policies that would
224. Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond
Kyoto 1 (2003). Negotiations regarding a successor agreement to Kyoto also include discussions of an
emissions trading system.
225. Stavins, supra note 59, at 15. R
226. Stewart & Weiner, supra note 224, at 1. R
227. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. R
228. Jon Hovi, Olav Schram Stokke & Geir Ulfstein, Implementing the Climate Regime:
International Compliance 3 (2005). The enforcement rules also demand that the breaching party (1)
draft an action plan for how it will come into compliance and (2) be prohibited from selling emissions
credits. Id. To the extent that the breaching state is a buyer of emissions credits, the thirty percent
increase to the emissions shortfall is the most concrete deterrent to breach. The legal status of the en-
forcement provisions is uncertain. Japan and Russia resisted the idea that the enforcement system would
be legally binding. Cathrine Hagem et al., Enforcing the Kyoto Protocol: Sanctions and Strategic Behavior, 33
Energy Pol. 2112, 2112 n.1 (2005).
229. Hovi, Stokke & Ulfstein, supra note 228, at 3. R
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lead to sustainable emissions levels, governments are free to overproduce
emissions and buy their way out of their emissions restrictions by purchas-
ing credits from other states. The remedy rules indicate a similar approach.
If a government does not wish to purchase sufficient emissions credits this
year, it can defer the payment until the following year at a set interest rate.
The interest rate of thirty percent is high, indicating a punitive element, but
a state can remain in compliance with the treaty regime by purchasing fewer
credits now or more credits later.
Does a government bound to the Kyoto Protocol suffer a loss of reputa-
tion for cooperativeness if it breaches the agreement’s substantive rules but
complies with the remedy provisions? An immediate concern is whether the
government will ultimately comply with the remedy by purchasing more
credits or by undertaking more stringent environmental action in the future.
Particularly in the environmental agreement context, where compliance
with the remedy may be a multi-year process, the audience may be uncertain
as to whether the breaching government plans to accept the remedy. But to
the extent that the audience believes that the government will accept the
remedy, does it matter to the audience whether the government buys emis-
sions credits now or thirty percent more credits later? While the answer will
depend on the beliefs of the audience, the system of emissions credits pric-
ing most likely decreases the reputational costs of breaching Kyoto’s sub-
stantive rules if the remedy is met. Already, member governments can buy
their way to compliance through purchased emissions credits. The difference
between buying some credits in this multi-year commitment period and
buying more in the next multi-year commitment period seems closer to a
financial calculation than a violation of a mandatory obligation.
Naturally, the designers of the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh Ac-
cords could have decided that reliance on formal remedies, such as a thirty
percent premium in emissions credits for any shortfall, was a better enforce-
ment system than informal remedies. Even many dedicated environmental-
ists may believe that reliance on moral suasion and reputational concerns has
not done enough to preserve the global atmospheric commons and that fi-
nancial penalties may be more effective in encouraging governments to take
action. Such an approach is completely reasonable. The issue addressed in
this Article is the relationship between informal and formal remedies. By
opting for a market-style system for first-order and second-order rule com-
pliance, the Kyoto Protocol and the Marrakesh Accords may undermine the
reputational costs to governments that fail to meet their emissions limits in
any given commitment period. This may be a cost that the drafters are will-
ing to accept in the hope of having more effective formal remedies, but the
drafters should be aware of this cost. Specifically, treaty designers may need
to increase the formal remedies to compensate for the decreased reputational
losses associated with breach.
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The possibility of a misalignment between the formal remedy and the
mandatory nature of the substantive rules also exists in human rights re-
gimes. Human rights agreements are likely to be viewed by the interna-
tional audience as far more mandatory than economic agreements. Yet even
within a human rights agreement, different rights have different social
meanings: rules requiring that a state not indefinitely detain individuals
without trial are likely to have more moral force than rules requiring the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.230 Many human rights agree-
ments provide formal remedies and authorize certain courts to award those
remedies. The most famous human rights court is the ECHR, which has
jurisdiction over all states within the Council of Europe.231 The ECHR offers
a range of remedies, from “just satisfaction”—the court’s judgment that a
breach of human rights obligations has taken place (yet no monetary award
is dispensed)—to monetary awards intended to compensate the victim.
While any breach of human rights obligations may come with a reputational
loss for the breaching state, the award of monetary compensation may re-
move some of the reputational sting from the finding.
For instance, the Russian government has repeatedly breached the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and has dutifully paid the required fine
in each instance.232 The ability to pay the fine, rather than changing its
policy, has allowed Russia to adopt a pay-as-you-go approach to breaches of
human rights obligations. These payments have kept Russia within the
bounds of the Convention and thus prevented a more severe sanction, such
as expulsion from the Council of Europe.233 This analysis also indicates that
remedies that are not meant to be compensatory, such as just satisfaction,
may act as a sanction rather than a price. The just satisfaction remedy might
be a wise option for a human rights court that lacks the remedies to deter
breach but desires to brand the breaching government as a violator of impor-
tant norms. The inability of the state to pay a remedy may actually increase
the state’s reputational loss because the state cannot remediate its breach.
VI. Conclusion
The creation of formal remedies is considered an unambiguous good for
international law. For a field obsessed with the lack of enforcement, the
230. See Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European Court of
Human Rights, 49 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (2008) (discussing the ECHR’s decisions interpreting intellectual
property rights as part of the right to property protected in the European Convention on Human Rights).
231. Id.at 2.
232. Human Rights Watch, Russia Country Summary (Jan. 2012) (noting that “the ECtHR had issued
more than 210 judgments holding Russia responsible for grave breaches of human rights in Chechnya.
Russia continues to pay the required monetary compensation to victims. But it fails to meaningfully
implement the core of the judgments, chiefly because it does not conduct effective investigations and
hold perpetrators accountable”).
233. Pamela Jordan, Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe and Compli-
ance with Human Rights Norms, 25 Hum. Rights Q. 660, 680–88 (2003).
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creation of international adjudicatory panels and the creation of “real” reme-
dies can signify the seriousness of the international obligation. International
law seems to approach domestic law in its access to independent adjudica-
tion and hard consequences for noncompliance. Yet the move towards inter-
national adjudication and remedies is a double-edged sword. The creation of
remedies can diminish the system of informal remedies that currently sup-
ports international law. The conventional view is that formal sanctions will
be additive to these informal sanctions—that the inclusion of informal sanc-
tions will only increase the costs of breach. But an alternative relationship is
also possible—that the move towards formal remedies will decrease access to
informal remedies, including reputation. In some cases, the access to formal
remedies will still be an “improvement” over the traditional approaches to
international law enforcement in the sense that the costs of breach are higher
with the addition of formal remedies. Yet in other circumstances, the costs
of breach may be lower with formal remedies. In either case, calculating the
overall cost of breach—necessary to the design of optimal remedy regimes—
requires an understanding of how informal and formal sanctions interact.
